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This paper evaluates the possible cross-border nature of a cartel uncovered and prosecuted in 
the bitumen industry in South Africa. The paper assesses whether the cartel in South Africa could 
have had an appreciable effect in the neighbouring states in the Southern Africa Customs Union 
(SACU) region, given their close economic integration and trade ties with South Africa. Qualitative 
and quantitative data analysis were undertaken to assess the possible impact of the cartel. First, 
a qualitative assessment of the industry stakeholders was conducted to evaluate competition in 
the bitumen industry within the SACU region. This covered the structural and behavioural 
characteristics of the industry which renders it susceptible to collusion. Second, trade data was 
used to demonstrate the dependency of the SACU member states on South Africa for their 
bitumen imports and an analysis of the pricing trends derived from the import prices was 
conducted. The trade data demonstrated that the SACU member states were almost wholly 
dependent on South Africa for their bitumen needs for the duration of the cartel, which was 
produced and supplied by the companies implicated in the cartel. Similar pricing trends to South 
Africa were also found in the SACU region. This suggests that the effects of the cartel may have 
extended beyond the South African borders. The contribution of the study is to highlight the 
significance of screening and timeously investigating cartel conduct prosecuted in neighbouring 
countries in cases where there is significant trade dependency, as these may have an appreciable 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Cartel conduct, or collusion, is when firms in a horizontal relationship have an agreement to 
restrict competition between each other, primarily by increasing prices, restricting output levels or 
allocating customers or geographical territories (Church and Ware, 2000). This conduct is often 
cited as the most egregious type of all anti-competitive conduct, as it usually results in the loss of 
consumer welfare and deadweight losses. Cartels bring harm to the overall economy by 
hampering the growth of firms and thus negatively affecting economic development of countries 
(Veljanovski, 2006). Unlike other arrangements that include forms of horizontal integration, hard 
core cartels generally lack any productive efficiency advantages. For this reason, collusion and 
cartel conduct are treated as ‘per se’ illegal in most countries.  
 
Competition policies and laws of countries in Southern Africa1 emphasise developmental goals 
such as job creation, poverty reduction and small business empowerment. These objectives of 
competition policy are in addition to the traditional efficiency rationale justifications of ensuring 
competitive outcomes in markets. However, in an environment where cartels are present, there 
is little likelihood that these objectives will be achieved. Therefore, anti-cartel enforcement is an 
imperative part of competition policy in the Southern African region as cartels are a direct attack 
on the principles of competition. Screening for, and prosecution of, cartels is therefore of 
importance in the region. 
 
The apartheid heritage in South Africa and the prevalence of regulation and government support 
during that period resulted in an economy with concentrated industries. Nationalist policies 
primarily meant to enhance industrialisation in the country often resulted in markets that were 
highly regulated in terms of both prices and output. Post market liberalisation, many of the firms 
continued with this behaviour, resulting in widespread illegal cartel activity in South Africa (OECD, 
2015).  
 
In the past 15 years, the Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) has had considerable 
achievements in uncovering and prosecuting cartels, although this has subsequently declined 
since 2014. Collusive behaviour has been uncovered in a range of industries including 
                                                          
1 For instance, other countries in Southern Africa like Namibia, eSwatini, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe 





construction, banking, petroleum and agriculture and agro-processing. The success in uncovering 
activities of cartels has mainly been attributed to the implementation of the Corporate Leniency 
Policy2. However, notwithstanding the aggressive enforcement against cartels and the fines 
levelled against the offenders, cartel activity in the region does not seem to be on a downward 
trajectory (Kaira, 2015). The on-going discovery of cartels in South Africa itself indicates that they 
remain relatively under-deterred. In part, this may be due to discovered cartels not being 
sanctioned in all jurisdictions where they caused harm and the sanctions not accounting for the 
harm in foreign markets. This is a possible indication that profits from cartel activity in multiple 
countries outweighs the costs of being prosecuted in just one jurisdiction. 
 
South Africa, as the largest (in terms of gross domestic product (GDP)) and most developed 
economy in the SACU region, henceforth  referred to as the region, has a significant influence on 
various supply chains in the region. The country is a source market for direct and indirect 
investment in many sectors across the region (Kaira, 2015). Many South African companies 
operate, or have a presence in the region through direct exports. Consequently, cartels 
prosecuted in South Africa, have at times involved firms that also operate or have a presence in 
the region. This then implores the question as to whether those companies that were uncovered 
to have participated in cartel arrangements in South Africa could have extended those 
arrangements into other countries in the region in which they have operations. In addition, it also 
raises the question of the impact of these collusive agreements in the region, if any. Literature 
provides evidence that cartel members commonly engage in several collusive agreements in 
geographical regions that are in close proximity (Ivaldi, Jenny and Khimich, 2016).  It is more likely 
that a firm, headed by executives that have breached antitrust laws in one market may also 
collude in other markets (Neyrinck, 2009). Furthermore, cross-border competition problems are 
often more pronounced among neighbouring countries relative to countries that are not close to 
each other geographically (Mehta, 2003). 
  
Extensive links in trade and investment between South Africa and other countries, especially 
those in the SACU region, therefore increase the probability of a cartel in South Africa being 
spread to the other neighbouring states where the same businesses operate. Firms that 
participate in one cartel are more inclined to participate in other collusive arrangements when the 
same firms are involved in different markets, primarily because they develop the rapport with their 
                                                          
2 The corporate leniency policy aims at eradicating and preventing cartels by setting out benefits, 






competitors and the organisational skills to make collusion more effective (Levenstein and 
Suslow, 2008). This is because even when explicit collusion ends, the nature of the agreements 
that existed between the firms in organizing their illegal conduct, the processes by which they 
monitored one another, and the mechanisms used to threaten punishment are not automatically 
forgotten by the former conspirators (Kovacic, Marshall, Marx and Raiff, 2007). In an adverse yet 
possible case, firms may cease cartel activity in South Africa, however, continue to maintain cartel 
activity in the other SACU member states with frail enforcement of anti-trust laws or those that do 
not have effective competition authorities (Kaira, 2015). 
 
As national economies integrate into the world economy through liberalisation and with each other 
through regional trade agreements, barriers to trade are lowered (Qaqaya, 2008). In addition, 
globalisation has augmented the area coverage of transactions and with that, the cross-border 
impact of anti-competitive practices (Armoogum, 2018). Thus, growth in global trade increases 
vulnerability to foreign sources of anti-competitive behaviour. This gives rise to the possibility that 
cartel arrangements may extend to other geographical locations where the firms operate. There 
have been several examples of this internationally. For example, competition authorities have 
turned their attention to cartels with cross-border dimensions, resulting in the successful 
prosecution of cartels in graphite, lysine, citric acid, vitamins, sorbate and sodium glucomate 
cartels in various jurisdictions (see Jenny, 2012, Connor, 2001, Levenstein and Suslow, 2008). 
  
While the South African authorities have achieved relative success in unearthing and prosecuting 
cartels since the enactment of the Corporate Leniency Policy in 2008, other competition 
authorities in the region have not been as successful in this regard (Kaira, 2015). There has been 
relatively little activity on the part of other countries in the region to respond to these cartels even 
after they have been uncovered in South Africa. Very little work has also been done on detecting 
and screening for collusive arrangements in firms with operations which transcends national 
borders in Africa. In addition, fewer efforts have been directed towards understanding cartel 
conduct with regional dimensions notwithstanding the linkages of most economies in Southern 
and East Africa (Roberts, Vilakazi, and Simbanegavi, 2014). This is of concern especially in SACU 
countries where markets are increasingly integrated, which is further compounded by the 
presence of multinational firms. Important to note that the SACU region does not have an effective 
regional competition authority, therefore the onus for any cartel investigation with regional 
dimensions is on the individual country authorities. Cartels uncovered in neighbouring countries 
with common firms are low hanging fruit for authorities to conduct cartel screening studies. 





scale economies of production of certain goods may imply that firms often organise production 
and distribution at a regional level. 
 
This study focuses on analysing the relationship between a specific cartel discovered and 
prosecuted in South Africa in the bitumen industry (‘the bitumen cartel’) and the neighbouring 
countries in the SACU region, namely Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and eSwatini. The SACU 
region is a Southern African regional economic organisation. The five member states (including 
South Africa) maintain a common external tariff, share customs revenues, and coordinate policies 
and decision-making on a wide range of trade issues.  
Previously a legal cartel in South Africa until its disbandment in 2000, the producers of bitumen 
contravened the South African competition law from September 2000 to December 2009. The 
companies that were prosecuted for this cartel comprised Total SA (Pty) Ltd, Sasol Limited, 
Engen Limited, Shell (Pty) Ltd, Tosas (Pty) Ltd, Masana Petroleum Solutions (Pty) Ltd, Chevron 
SA (Pty) Ltd and the industry association, Southern African Bitumen Association (SABITA). 
SABITA was made up of all members from the implicated oil companies. This case is suitable for 
analysis because the companies implicated in the cartel have operations in, or export to, the 
region. Moreover, this case is of importance because bitumen is a significant input into road 
construction and maintenance. Therefore, given the need to develop road infrastructure in the 
region, bitumen is a critical product. This study is the first attempt to review and assess the 
possible relationship and potential impact between the bitumen cartel prosecuted in South African 
and the SACU member states. The key objective addressed in this study is:  
Could the bitumen cartel that was discovered and prosecuted in South Africa have affected 
the SACU region member states? 
In addressing this objective, this study will specifically consider the following research questions: 
1. What are the structural and behavioural characteristics of the bitumen industry in the 
SACU region that could have facilitated collusion? 
2. How did the prices of bitumen differ between the domestic market (South Africa) and the   
export markets (in the rest of SACU) during and post the cartel period and what does this 
indicate about the possibility of regional cartel activity? 
3. What could have been the possible impact of the South African bitumen cartel in the SACU 
member states? 





In terms of this cartel, investigations were not extended to markets in the SACU member states 
to inquire whether markets were cartelised or directly affected by the cartel uncovered in South 
Africa. This is despite the possibility that the cartel that was uncovered in South Africa could have 
been facilitated by the bounds of the common customs union which make the movement of goods 
between South Africa and its SACU neighbours more attractive. This is further facilitated by 
relatively shorter distances between the countries. These factors, along with the same players 
implicated in the South African cartel, render it plausible that firms could have developed 
strategies at a regional level given the bulky nature of the bitumen plants and the importance of 
securing sufficiently large localised markets to ensure offtake and scale.  
 
This study will undertake basic screening using trade data trends and pricing data of bitumen 
between South Africa and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and eSwatini during and post the 
uncovering of the cartel in South Africa to analyse the impact of the cartel on the SACU member 
states. This impact is either through exports from South Africa to these countries or through similar 
arrangements entered into by the same companies in these countries. This research contributes 
to the literature of the cross-border dimension of cartels by using a combination of trade data and 
assessing qualitative factors to screen for a cartel uncovered in one jurisdiction which could have 
had significant effects in other jurisdictions with close trade links.  
 
The study used mixed qualitative and quantitative methods for analyses. Qualitatively, it maps 
out the structure of the bitumen value chain in the SACU region and the major suppliers across 
the countries. Semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the bitumen industry from the 
SACU region were undertaken to get insights into the competitive landscape in bitumen markets, 
as well as to inform structural and other forms of behavioural screening. The quantitative methods 
employed included the analysis of the trade data and relative country prices, and evaluating if 
these are more consistent with competition or collusion. The study primarily adopts screening 
approaches as proposed in the literature review by Harrington (2006) and assessments of trade 
data as proposed by Levenstein and Suslow (2012). 
 
This dissertation is organised as follows - a literature review on the economics of cartels, cross-
border cartels and screening of cartels is undertaken in Chapter 2. The literature on calculating 
cartel overcharges is also presented here. Chapter 3 describes the research methodology 
employed and the data used in this dissertation. Chapter 4 firstly provides the background to the 
bitumen cartel case that was uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa. It then presents the 





have potentially extended to the SACU region member states. Chapter 5 concludes, summarising 
key findings and putting forward policy proposals. 
CHAPTER 2:  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The research seeks to evaluate the cross-border dimensions of the bitumen cartel. This Chapter 
begins with the foundations of cartels and collusive agreements in Section 2.2. Once the 
foundation is laid, the literature on regional cartels or cartels with regional dimensions is assessed 
in Section 2.3. The discussion then considers the main reasons for anti-trust authorities in the 
SACU countries to investigate the possible impact of uncovered and successfully prosecuted 
cartels in South Africa, particularly in cases which involve the same firms operating in the region. 
A discussion on the literature on screening and cartel overcharges is finally undertaken in 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. This forms the foundation of the analysis conducted in this 
dissertation. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 The economics of cartels 
 
Collusion or cartel behaviour refers to conduct by companies with the purpose of jointly 
maximising profits through the coordination of the activities of firms. This occurs when a collective 
of companies in the same line of business, supplying similar products or services concludes an 
arrangement to fix prices and or to split the market and increase prices for customers. Accordingly, 
the collusive equilibrium is one in which the prices are above the competitive price levels. This 
harms consumers who are subjected to higher prices and often reduced consumption (Motta, 
2004).   
 
Firms also join cartels to grow their power in the market by working collectively to fix output levels 
to be produced by each member and/or prices to be charged to customers. Cartels grant 
companies in a market collective market power to cooperate in determining prices, dividing the 
market or production, allocating clients and territorial markets. With respects to price-fixing, 
cooperation by the cartelists may include collective action to determine a minimum selling price, 
terminate discounts and enforce a uniform formula for calculating prices (Church and Ware, 
2000). Contrary to other forms of independent conduct by companies which also cause prices to 
increase to levels more than the competitive price levels, cartel arrangements depend on 
communications between the firms (Motta, 2004). The theoretical definition of collusion is 





coordinate their actions through an agreement and monitor the agreement through constant 
communication. Consequently, explicit collusion involves overt communication and discussions 
between firms in the form of documents, meetings and telephone calls.    
 
On the other hand, tacit collusion is coordination without direct communication. Tacit collusive 
arrangements happen when companies collectively adjust their prices through their awareness of 
competitors pricing trends. This occurs when all companies observe each other’s collective 
interlinkages as well as gains from collusive action, thus firms anticipate that rivals will match any 
increase in prices or decline in output. The existence of an explicit agreement between the 
colluding firms is the fundamental distinction separating explicit and tacit collusion. Unlike explicit 
collusion, which is prohibited in law by many jurisdictions, tacit collusion is not prohibited in 
competition law, hence companies implicated in tacit collusion are not liable for fines, even though 
tacit collusion often results in economic harm identical to that of explicit collusion (Garrod and 
Olczak, 2018).  
 
As noted, cartel agreements are generally acknowledged as one of the most detrimental forms of 
anti-competitive behaviour. They differ from other prohibited arrangements in that they constrain 
competition without producing any other balancing benefits (Klimašauskienė and Giedraitis, 
2011). In addition, cartel conduct has no redeeming features as it is aimed at reducing competition 
in order to make excess profits or to avoid losses.  Therefore, negative effects of cartels in the 
economy and consumer welfare are considerable. This significant harm is identifiable in the way 
in which anti-trust authorities handle cartel conduct in various jurisdictions. Cartel conduct is illegal 
in almost all jurisdictions, although laws and enforcement vary across the globe. In South Africa, 
the Competition Act No. 89 of 1998 as amended prohibits cartel conduct under Section 4.   
 
Cartels are harmful to consumers, as cartelised industries do not exhibit competition, which 
diminishes competitiveness and has adverse effects on general economic activity of a country. 
The lack of competition is when firms jointly coordinate their actions while competitiveness is 
about the companies’ ability to do better than others through innovation. Cartels change market 
dynamics, often resulting in sluggish innovation because colluding firms which charge higher 
prices have little incentive to invest in research and development (Günster, Carree and van Dijk, 
2011). Cartels also lead to allocative inefficiencies (this occurs when consumers do not pay 
an efficient price), umbrella effects and non-price harm to quality and variety (Connor, 2008). 
Umbrella effects occur when the existence of a cartel permits non-colluding firms to charge higher 





above competitive levels (Connor, 2008).  However, often the poor suffer disproportionately from 
the effects of collusion as high prices, particularly those of essential goods and services, force 
the poor to consume less or none of the cartelised goods. It is for these reasons that the detection 
and prosecution of cartels is given high priority especially in developing countries, like those in 
the SACU region where there is a higher proportion of poor people.  
 
Nevertheless, reasons have been provided on the benefits of cartels. There have been assertions 
that cartel conduct is beneficial to avoid damaging competitive behaviour in industries with large 
sunk costs. This was the argument in the US Trans-Missouri case where eighteen railroad 
companies formed an association to fix rates, on the basis that competition will not be beneficial 
for the final consumers (Veljanovski, 2006). In the South African bitumen price-fixing case under 
study, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, the oil companies also argued that due to the nature of 
the bitumen industry, the consumers of bitumen desired a fixed and more transparent pricing 
mechanism (Boshoff, 2015). There are provisions in the South African Competition Act under 
section 4 (1) (a) that allow for a rule of reason evaluation in cartel cases for efficiency justification. 
However, the bitumen cartel case was not found to fall within the purview of this section. 
Moreover, the prosecuted companies did not apply for an exemption to continue coordinating 
following the ending of the legal cartel. 
 
Another theoretical case for non-intervention in cartels is that they are inherently unsteady and 
short-term in nature and consequently, are often not regarded as being serious (Veljanovski, 
2006). Game theory suggests that cartels are generally unstable and may be short-lived. The 
behaviour of members in a cartel is an example of the well-known prisoner’s dilemma. Each 
member of the cartel faces a conflict of interest. By producing more output than it has agreed to 
produce and by undercutting on the agreed price, a cartel member can increase its share of cartel 
profits. Hence, there is an inherent incentive for each cartel member to cheat on the agreement 
and undercut prices by selling more units (Motta, 2004). However, some game theorists such as 
Benoit and Krishna (1984) have argued, in contrast, that repeated interaction over time or across 
markets could deter firms from cheating by providing higher future collusive profits. The probability 
of cheating and the consequent deviation from the collusive agreement relies on the future 
benefits from the collusive agreement being greater than benefits from cheating on the collusive 
agreement with prospects of facing severe punishment. Empirical evidence from prosecuted 
cartels shows that cartelists are often able to overcome material differences which cause 





(2004) on 167 cartels discovered after 1990 which found that the average duration of cartels is 
six years.  
 
Industrial organisation economists have identified a number of factors relating to market structure 
and market behaviour which might facilitate collusion. The factors and characteristics which make 
collusion easier to maintain in various markets have been outlined by several authors (see Stigler, 
1964, Symeonidis, 2003, Connor, 2008 and Grout and Sonderegger, 2005). Cartel conduct is 
more likely in market structures with homogenous products, high concentration of firms, high 
barriers to entry, stable demand conditions, a history of a legal collusion, high ratio of fixed to 
variable costs, transparency in pricing and symmetry among firms, multi-market contact between 
firms, existence of a trade association and cross ownership among firms (Church and Ware, 
2000).  Some of these factors will be elaborated in Chapter 4 under the section on structural 
analysis. 
In terms of market behaviour, certain outcomes indicate that collusion may have occurred, for 
instance, when there is low observable variance in prices over time, high levels of price 
transparency maintained between players, strong correlation in prices without corresponding 
increases in input costs and highly stable market shares over time for the individual firms 
(Harrington, 2006). Information exchange between competitors increases market transparency 
which facilitates collusion. It reduces strategic uncertainty about competitors’ behaviour, allowing 
for better and more effective monitoring of cartelist deviating from the collusive agreement. It also 
allows for more targeted punishment of deviators (das Nair and Mncube, 2012). Several of these 
market characteristics, such as concentration of firms, a history of collusion, a homogenous 
product, high barriers to entry, multimarket contact and a trade association are present in the 
market for bitumen in the SACU region as will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.3 Cross-border cartels 
 
Connor (2011) defines international cartels as those that operate across different geographical 
locations, noting a difference between private international cartels and those that are government 
directed or sponsored. Examples of the latter are the export cartel arrangement like the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and cartels registered in terms of the 
Webb-Pomerene Act in the United States (US). In general, cross-border cartel conduct is 
comparable to cartel conduct that is geographically localised, the principal and obvious difference 






    
Literature provides reasons for why firms would organise as cartels to do business across 
borders. It is argued that coordination among firms permits small and medium-sized firms to 
collectively access global markets, which they are unable to access individually. The pooling of 
their resources allows the firms to establish joint-selling agencies to engage in joint market 
research, advertising and international trade activities. This often also results in a reduction of 
costs required to meet the labelling, packaging and quality standards of countries to which they 
export. Accordingly, cross-border cartels are then able to trade more competitively in export 
markets with significantly high barriers to entry and risks. In addition, the coordination of firms’ 
resources minimises the risks of supply disruptions (Jenny, 2012).   
 
Similar to localised cartels, cross-border cartels harm competition and result in high prices for 
goods and services. Furthermore, cross-border cartels undermine economic integration across 
nations, decrease the benefits of liberalisation to consumers, and distort world trade (OECD, 
2003). Cross-border cartels typically achieve more damaging long-run price effects, displaying 
greater effectiveness in raising prices compared to national cartels (Connor and Lande, 2006). 
Furthermore, the ability of the firms in cross-border cartels to observe international trade data 
(published exports, imports and customs data) increases the probability of cartel success. 
Consequently, the mean durability of global cartels is generally longer for cross-border cartels 
than for geographically limited cartels (Connor, 2011).  
 
A common characteristic of cross-border cartels is the power to control prices on a regional or 
global basis (Griffin, 2001). The cartel members in such agreements meet regularly to fix prices 
either on a global basis, in some instances on a region-by-region basis or on a country-by-country 
basis. Another characteristic of cross-border cartels is the use of trade associations to facilitate 
cartel conduct. Trade associations had a vital role in the organization and monitoring of activities 
of a large number of international cartels uncovered and prosecuted by the European Commission 
(EC) (see Levenstein and Suslow, 2001). Moreover, many of the cross-border cartels that have 
been prosecuted by the US Department of Justice, made use of trade association meetings as a 
convincing front for their clandestine cartel meetings (Griffin, 2001). For instance, the global lysine 
cartel members created an amino acid working group to function as a trade association, despite 
the fact that the intention of the new association was to afford the colluding firms a legal reason 
for the cartel members to meet each other and for them to discuss their collusive arrangements 
(Connor, 2007). Similarly, the citric acid cartel members used an authorised industry trade 





arranged to fix the prices of citric acid and establish global market share quotas (Levenstein and 
Suslow, 2003). Another characteristic of cross-border cartels is that they usually comprise of firms 
that dominate the production facilities regionally (Connor, 2007). In addition, cross-border cartel 
activity is more pronounced in industries that deal in homogenous products with low transit costs 
(Connor, 2007).  
 
Given an increase in the detection and prosecution of cartels with cross-border dimensions in 
recent years, cross-border cartel detection and enforcement is an area that has received 
significant attention internationally. Moreover, falling tariffs and a rising number of multilateral 
trade agreements and the increase in international trade have further expanded the range of 
products at risk of international price-fixing (Levenstein and Suslow, 2008). In order to address 
cross-border cartels, many competition authorities around the globe are increasing cooperation. 
Advanced economies have demonstrated the benefits of bilateral cooperation between 
competition authorities in addressing cartels with cross-border effects. The benefits of bilateral 
coordination include exchange of information and resource support to less equipped competition 
authorities to deal with complex cartels. This was demonstrated, for example, in the investigations 
that took place in the US, Europe, Canada, Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Singapore 
and Australia in the automotive parts cartel. The cartel entailed collusion on prices and the rigging 
of bids in automotive parts among firms operating in these countries. Consequently, the 
automotive parts cartel resulted in significant fines across various jurisdictions (Connor, 2012), 
greatly aided by close corporation among the competition authorities in terms of sharing of 
information which was required to commence investigations in other jurisdictions. 
 
Directly relevant to this dissertation, various cross-border cartels have also existed in the bitumen 
industry. In Europe, cartels in the bitumen industry were uncovered and prosecuted in the 
Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. In all the cases, the same firms who are multinationals were 
involved. All the price-fixing cases were initiated following BP Plc’s simultaneous application for 
leniency in the different jurisdictions. In all jurisdictions, the cartel members had agreed to engage 
in anti-competitive conduct essentially involving: 1) price-fixing, 2) allocation of quotas, 3) volume 
and customer allocation, 4) exchange of sensitive information and 5) side payments to reimburse 
cartel members according to the market allocation agreements3 4. Cartelist also monitored the 
                                                          
3Case number: COMP/38710 – Bitumen Spain  





implementation of market sharing arrangements and, to that effect, fixed the bitumen prices and 
agreed on the date on which price changes would be effective. 
 
Given the close integration of the European markets, it was necessary for the EC to determine 
whether the cartels were linked by carrying out inquires for further information under a single case 
number. In the end, the EC contended that only the bitumen cartel in Spain had an appreciable 
effect upon the other European Union member states. A significant part of penetration bitumen in 
Spain (estimated at 20%) during the cartel period, was imported from seven5 other European Union 
member countries and the bitumen suppliers also exported penetration bitumen from Spain to other 
member states. The areas most affected by imports were those bordering France and Portugal and 
those surrounding coastal bitumen depots, which stored imported bitumen for its subsequent sale. 
In a geographically widespread cartel case like the bitumen cartel in Spain, the EC adds to the 
gravity of the cartel in terms of effects, which is subsequently used to calculate damages6 (Connor, 
2007b). 
 
As will be discussed in Chapter 4, there was an overlap in the companies prosecuted in Europe 
and in the bitumen cartel prosecuted in South Africa.  Bitumen producers that were prosecuted in 
Europe including BP, Total and Shell have operations not only in South Africa but also in the 
SACU region. It is important to screen for evidence of cartel conduct and the possible impact of 
the prosecuted cartel on the SACU countries given that cartel members may find it even more 
profitable to get involved in numerous cartels in different jurisdictions that are in close proximity 
(Ivaldi, Jenny and Khimich, 2016).  This is more the case if the probability of getting caught and 
prosecuted is small in some jurisdictions. Furthermore, if firms associated with the same company 
groups are present across the region, then the incentive to compete across borders and between 
themselves is reduced (Vilakazi, 2016). The multi-market contact between the companies in 
several different petroleum products presents them with additional incentive to cooperate rather 
than compete as they have frequent interactions, with opportunities to monitor each other’s 
reactions in the different market. Thus, there is a basis to review the possible impact of this cartel 
in the neighbouring SACU countries. 
 
There have been limited studies that have extensively evaluated cross-border cartels across the 
African continent. In Southern Africa, Vilakazi (2016) studied the regional cement cartel and the 
developments in the cement industry after the cartel was uncovered. A cartel in the cement 
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industry which was detected in South Africa affected all SACU member states. The three cement 
producers, Pretoria Portland Cement (PPC), Afrisam and Lafarge S.A who jointly owned the fourth 
producer - Natal Portland Cement (NPC) agreed on pricing parameters and allocated specific 
country markets to different producers7. The cartel members also admitted to allocating certain 
markets in the SACU region to each member as well as monitoring their arrangement by 
observing sales data. Other cartels with possible cross-border dimensions that have been 
uncovered were in scrap metal, construction, concrete pipes and culverts, pilings, steel products 
and industrial gases (Kaira, 2015).  These cartels could have had a direct or an indirect impact 
on the traded products, possibly affecting at least two countries in Southern Africa, considering 
the significant trade between South Africa and the neighbouring countries in these industries.  
 
Despite the close trade ties between South Africa and SACU countries, there has been little 
initiative to investigate these cartels originating from South Africa by the competition authorities 
from the region. This is in stark contrast to the Canadian competition authority’s conduct. The 
Canadian authority has regularly followed-up on cartel cases against companies that have been 
probed by the US Department of Justice (Levenstein and Suslow, 2003) in neighbouring US. This 
has largely been on the premise of the close trade ties between the countries and the overlap of 
companies operating across the two countries. The lack of investigations in the SACU region after 
cartels are prosecuted in South Africa suggests that there is a gap in collaboration and 
cooperation between competition authorities in the region in this area. Therefore, conducting 
screens and impact assessments (similar to what is undertaken in this dissertation), on the effects 
of these regional arrangements and their prosecution would be an important first step in 
generating support for increased cooperation and allocation of resources towards detecting and 
prosecuting cartels. 
 
The approach by the Canadian competition authorities reveals how information gathered from 
other jurisdictions can and ought to be used by other competition agencies for their domestic 
investigations. This does not have to involve sharing of confidential information between 
authorities. Investigations in neighbouring countries can used as a signal to initiate investigations 
in local markets in which the same firms operate in order to assess if any anti-competitive conduct 
was extended across borders (Khimich, Ivaldi and Jenny, 2011). This is important considering 
that it is possible for firms to confess to cartel involvement in one market while continuing to 
collude explicitly or tacitly in other markets (Nontombana and Lesofe, 2010). For example, in the 
                                                          





global graphite electrodes cartel, cartel conduct continued in other markets outside Europe, at 
least a year after the EC’s commenced investigations (Levenstein and Suslow, 2003).  
 
In order to address cross-border competition enforcement, there are regional competition regimes 
in Africa that are meant to deal with cross-border cartel enforcement. Due to inadequate 
resources and often high cost associated with investigating cross-border anti-competitive conduct 
for national authorities, regional competition regimes offer an opportunity for investigations at the 
regional level. The regional competition regimes established in Africa include the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Competition Commission (CCC), East African 
Community Competition Authority, Competition Authority of the Central African Monetary and 
Economic Community, West Africa Economic and Monetary Union Competition Commission. 
While some of these regional competition authorities have made progress in merger control with 
a cross-border dimension, there has been very little activity on investigating cartels with cross-
border dimensions. Few cases of cooperation have been publicised, although the agencies in the 
region are indeed cooperating. This cooperation appears to nonetheless be on a lesser scale 
compared to their counterparts in the developed world (Armoogum, 2018). Of the SACU member 
states, Swaziland is the only country that has membership in a regional competition authority, the 
CCC. 
The next section reviews literature on screening for cartels as a tool to assess whether there is 
possible cross-border links in the bitumen case uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa. 
2.4 Screening for cartel conduct 
 
The most important part in a legal cartel case is proving that an agreement existed. However, getting 
direct evidence of a cartel agreement often proves to be difficult. Cartel operators work in secret 
and are often obviously reluctant to cooperate with investigators given the repercussions of 
prosecution. In these circumstances, economic screening can play a role in suggesting the 
existence of an agreement. Screening is intended to provide evidence to justify an in-depth 
investigation and not intended to deliver the evidence to prosecute a cartel case. Furthermore, 
screening can disable cartels by discovering them and making them less stable as firms adjust their 
behaviour to avoid being discovered. 
 
Harrington (2006) defines screening as the process of identifying industries in which the existence 
of a cartel is more likely. Screening refers to a cost-effective method for identifying industries 





deeper investigation that directly contrasts collusion and competition as competing explanations 
of certain market outcomes. Therefore, screening identifies suspicious behaviour that is 
inconsistent with competition. Screens also help authorities to estimate the duration of the 
infringement, by identifying the starting point and the end of any collusive arrangement (Zlatcu 
and Siciu, 2017).  However, it does not provide conclusive evidence of collusion. 
 
Screening for cartels is thus a proactive technique for the detection of cartels (OECD, 2015). 
Proactive methods entail initiatives by the competition authorities, while reactive methods are 
complaints filed by various stakeholders, which include competitors, customers and employees 
of the companies, whistle-blowers and requests for leniency. Screening may also serve as an 
additional incentive for companies to submit leniency applications if the cartel members believe 
that a screening exercise will result in cartel outcomes being exposed. Thus, active screening of 
cartels in the region could encourage more leniency applications and discourage firms from 
engaging in collusive agreements.  
 
Economic screening uses available data, such as prices, volumes, spreads, costs, estimated 
market shares, trade data and any other available relevant data. Like any statistical test, the 
construction of an economic screen is subject to type I and type II errors.  In practice, a type I 
error is the incorrect rejection of a competitive process in the market, while a type II error, is the 
incorrect failure to reject a collusive process in the market. Albuquerque and Cuibano (2015) 
identified properties for good economic screening to be those that minimize both type I and type 
II errors, which are easy to implement and those that are expensive for companies to disguise as 
part of their collusive behaviour. Therefore, effective implementation of cartel screens depends 
on the extent to which an economic screen is properly developed and applied. The quality of data 
is also fundamental in cartel screening. Poor quality data cannot lead to successful cartel 
detection activity. For this reason, access to quality data should be taken into consideration when 
deciding whether to undertake screening.  
 
Harrington (2006) identified two general ways to screen for cartels: firstly, by observing the means 
by which the firms coordinate and secondly by observing the results of such coordination. The 
former entails observing structural factors and the means of coordination in a form of direct 
communication while the latter refers to observing the patterns of firms’ prices or quantities or 
other aspect of market behaviour. The means by which firms coordinate can be sub-divided into 
structural factors, demand-related factors and supply-related factors. Screening for structural 





collusion. These include concentration in the market, high barriers to entry, frequent interaction 
between firms and market pricing transparency. These factors are referenced in literature in 
section 2.2 above. Demand-related factors that facilitate collusion include stable and predictable 
market growth, absence of significant demand fluctuations or business cycles, low demand 
elasticity, absence of buyer power and network effects. The supply-related factors that facilitate 
collusion include mature industries with stable technologies, symmetric costs and capacities, 
product homogeneity, multi market contact, structural links and other contractual agreements 
(Hellwig and Hüschelrath, 2017). The structural screening methodology used in this dissertation 
is detailed in Chapter 4. 
 
Behavioural screening involves methods of assessing whether the patterns of prices, quantities, 
market decision outcomes and market shares appear to be consistent with competition or with 
collusion. Collusion is generally more likely when market behaviour evidence shows strong 
correlation in prices, low price variance over time, high levels of market transparency, high prices 
without associated increases in costs and stable market shares over time for individual firms 
(Harrington, 2006). Another key collusive marker is trends in quantities that are subject to large 
and persistent changes in the absence of underlying demand and cost changes. The analysis of 
market data can assist to differentiate a collusive environment from a competitive one. For 
instance, the NASDAQ collusion case was discovered based only on market data with limited 
non-economic evidence stemming directly from a study of pricing patterns by Christie and Schultz 
(1994). The study found that collusion took the form of avoiding the quoting of odd-eighths pricing 
of stocks so that market makers would post wider bid prices. This resulted in a minimum bid-ask 
spread increase of 0.25 in that market (Christie and Schultz, 1994), which therefore harmed the 
investors in the market to the benefit of the traders.  
 
Evidence on pricing behaviour over time can also be analysed to understand the creation, life and 
break up of a cartel or likely rules under which a cartel operated (Harrington, 2006). It can further 
be used to date the beginning of known conspiracies, which is often difficult in practice (Crede, 
2019). Price changes at the time of cartel formation or at the end of a cartel can be useful markers. 
At the beginning of a cartel, prices gradually increase, as a cartel experiments with the price 
increases that the market can bear. Likewise, at the end of cartel agreements there is usually a 
sudden price collapse, while during the cartel period there may be observable indications of price 
wars. Nevertheless, suspicious behaviour in a market detected using economic analysis does not 
amount to conclusive evidence, but warrants in-depth further investigations as there is a 





trends are explained by common underlying costs. Underlying factors can also include common 
exogenous shocks such as the increase in input prices for all suppliers, or an increase in inflation. 
However, suspicions that there is collusion often arise when the uniformity extends to other 
dimensions of the price such as those of ancillary services and discounts.  
 
The analysis of prices can provide very useful indications as to whether a cartel is/was possibly 
in action (Abrantes-Metz, 2013). Although theory postulates that prices are higher during collusion 
in comparison with non-collusive periods, empirical and experimental economic studies provide 
mixed evidence on price variance behaviour. This illustrates that analysing only at the first two 
moments of price movements (average prices and variance) may be insufficient.  The presence 
of a trend in prices, for example, due to underlying factors can be biased by the length of the 
cartel period and the length of the competitive period. Therefore, in order to accurately identify 
the difference in price setting behaviour independently of underlying market characteristics, it is 
important to compare the entire distribution of price changes over a price cycle (Von 
Blanckenburg, Geist and Kholodilin, 2012).  This can be done by analysing the evolution of 
industry prices over a longer period (Motta, 2004).  
 
Stable market shares for each industry participant over a period may be an indication of cartel 
activity. Stability in market shares could be a consequence of collusive arrangements to divide 
markets or clients. A study done by Stigler (1964) found that allocating market shares among the 
cartelist is presumably the best way to deal with cheating by the cartel members.  Another 
collusive marker is low price variance. Low price variance is when the variation relating to price 
changes is low over time. In practice, a screen could monitor the price variance and assess 
whether it is low relative to some benchmark. As shown by variance screens, when a cartel is 
active, prices tend to be less responsive to costs and generally less variable (Abrante-Metz, 
Froeb, Gewenke and Taylor, 2006).  
 
The harm imposed by cartels on society makes it imperative to put in place measures to combat 
their existence. To that effect, competition authorities, academics and consultants have designed 
a variety of economic screening tools in order to identify problems in competition. Econometric 
screens in particular, if designed well, can be useful tools in detecting deviations from competitive 
patterns, and can help to improve cartel enforcement. Moreover, they can reduce the extent of 
cartels’ ability to secretly restrict competition. However, econometric screening like other 
screening methodologies only provide an indication of where the most obvious patterns occur, 





replace a more detailed understanding of the industry-specific dynamics that may explain market 
conduct in the absence of evidence of actual anti-competitive behaviour. Such reasons might 
include technology shifts, entry into the market or market exits. Furthermore, it is worth noting that 
screens do not differentiate between tacit and explicit collusion. Moreover, the main disadvantage 
of economic screens is their demand of large amounts of data of high quality and extent of the 
analysis, which often requires controlling for many factors.  As noted by Harrington (2006), quality 
data are often hard to obtain and the processing of a huge amount of data is costly and time 
consuming.  
 
In terms of studies using econometric methods, Bolotova, Connor and Miller (2008) used the 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) econometric models to test the hypothesis of the 
behaviour of the price distribution (mean and variance) during the collusive and non-collusive 
periods using two global cartel cases (citric acid and lysine). The study found that variance of 
prices during the lysine conspiracy was lower than the variance of prices during pre-cartel and 
post-cartel periods as expected. In contrast, the variance of prices during the citric acid conspiracy 
was higher relative to periods that were deemed more competitive. An advantage of using the 
ARCH and GARCH models is that they may use a relatively small sample of prices for a cartelized 
product before, during and after a hypothesised or known conspiracy (Bolotova, Connor and 
Miller, 2008).  
 
The next section assesses empirical studies conducted on the impact of collusion. The studies 
measure overcharges which directly translate to the gain derived from collusion for the firms 
involved. This is important for this dissertation because it demonstrates the potential harm inflicted 
by cartels especially in a cross-border context. 
2.5 Cartel overcharges 
 
The most commonly used methodology to estimate damages triggered by cartels is the 
calculation of price overcharges. Connor (2014) defined a price overcharge as an increase in 
prices of products for purchasers due to an effective sellers’ cartel. A price-fixing overcharge is a 
transfer of income or wealth from buyers to the members of the cartel that occurs due to an overt 
collusive agreement (Connor, 2007). According to Boyer and Kotchoni (2015), the estimation of 
cartel overcharges lies at the heart of antitrust policy in cartel prosecution as it constitutes a key 





cartel-enhanced prices to an appropriate non-collusive competitive benchmark price. The cartel 
price is often observed, whilst the “but-for” price needs to be estimated. The overcharge is often 
expressed as a percentage of the “but-for” price and this amount depends on the durability of 
cartel and size of the overcharge (Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts, 2014).  
 
General studies of cartels only involve samples which consist of uncovered and prosecuted 
cartels instead of the entire universe of cartels. This implies that the sample of cartels for which 
price overcharges can be calculated is small relative to the entire universe of cartels. Moreover, 
final verdicts involving a calculation of overcharges are unsurprisingly rare because almost all 
cartel claims settle or are dismissed before an overcharge can be calculated by a neutral observer 
and made public as part of the records of the case. Settlements, on the other hand, are an 
extremely unreliable guide on the size of overcharges of the underlying cartel cases. This is 
because firms often opt for settlements if the perceived claims and fines through litigation are 
deemed higher. Thus, the damage caused by cartels has largely been underestimated in most 
settlement cases (Monti, 2001). 
 
A survey conducted by Connor (2004) found median cartel overcharges in international cartels of 
30% compared to 17.2% for domestic cartels. The substantially higher overcharges in 
international cartels increases the importance for regional cartel detection and prosecution. 
Cross-border cartels appear to be more injurious than national or domestic cartels. To that effect, 
Connor and Lande (2008) found that cross-border collusive arrangements are capable of 
increasing prices by 75% more than local cartels. The much higher price increase success in 
cross-border cartels is because they are formed with less concern about prosecution, especially 
in jurisdictions that lack an effective competition authority or those with weak enforcement. 
Academic work on the global vitamins cartel corroborated the point on cross-border cartels 
thriving in countries with weak cartel enforcement. Cartel overcharges were comparatively larger 
in jurisdictions that did not have effective competition authorities. In addition, cross-border cartels 
are anticipated to have larger cartel overcharges compared to localised cartels due to feasible 
price discrimination (Connor and Bolotova, 2006). This is because they are able to charge 
different prices for the same product in different markets. Furthermore, cross-border cartels are 
more effective due to the greater freedom from the threat of entry by competitors compared to 
more geographically localised cartels, because entry into a foreign market requires a high level 






Various approaches have been used to measure price overcharges and their appropriateness 
hinges on the economic context, availability of data and certain aspects relating specifically to the 
case under investigation. To calculate the level of overcharges, comparator-based methodologies 
are frequently used to measure the level of overcharges. These methods use cross sectional 
comparisons, time series comparisons or a combination of both methods - difference-in-difference 
methodology, (Hüschelrath, Müller and Veith, 2013). The difference-in-difference method 
assesses the change in price for a cartelised market over time, and compares this change against 
the change in price in a non-cartelized market over the same period. Methods for calculating 
overcharges are methods that seek to calculate the “but for prices” (counterfactual prices). The 
“but for” or “counterfactual price” is the price that would have been charged absent the cartel. In 
terms of the methodologies used to measure the “but for” price and the level overcharges are the 
“before and after approach”, “yardstick approach”, “cost-based approach” and econometric and 
simulation models (Boyer and Kotchoni, 2015).  
 
The simplest and most frequently used method is the “before and after” approach which involves 
selecting a beginning and an end price point for the cartelised product and comparing the price 
changes. In the “yardstick approach”, the cartelised market is compared with a similar market 
unaffected by the cartel. The “cost based approach” estimates overcharges by comparing the 
average or marginal cost-plus a reasonable mark-up with actual prices. Connor and Lande (2004) 
surveyed 450 studies of cartels, which contained 549 observations of “average” overcharges. 
They found that the most widely used method to calculate overcharges is the “before and after 
method”. The second most popular method is econometric modelling, while the yardstick and 
cost-based are the least frequently employed in practice. 
 
In practical terms, most econometric modelling techniques are an augmentation of the “before 
and after” methodology (Connor, 2007b). These models usually specify the demand and supply 
conditions in the relevant market and then investigate through statistical tests whether and to what 
extent changes in prices or output fail to respond to normal, competitive market forces (Connor, 
2007). Results of econometric screens are often considered as most credible because these 
models can simultaneously incorporate a wide range of factors. However, in practice very few 
studies use econometric techniques to calculate overcharges due to the data intensity involved. 
 
Although cartel overcharges are a well-studied field of competition economics, studies of cartel 
overcharges are few in Southern Africa. Only a few cartel overcharges have been calculated for 





South Africa include Khumalo, Mashiane and Roberts (2014) who conducted a cartel overcharge 
study on the precast concrete products cartel and estimated cartel overcharges between 21% 
and 57% for concrete pipes in Kwa-Zulu Natal and 16.5% in Gauteng.  Mncube (2014) provided 
an overcharge estimate by applying a “before and after” approach as well as a constant-margin 
method for the South African flour cartel, which was operational between 1999 and 2007 
concluding that the overcharges for the white bread flour cartel were 23.7% in the Western Cape 
and 13.1% in Gauteng province. A study by Mondliwa and das Nair (2019) computed overcharges 
on the overall harm imposed by the reinforcing steel bar cartel in the South African market.  They 
computed the average cartel overcharges to be 42.6%.  The paper explored different hypotheses 
used to ascertain the prices that would have prevailed in a competitive environment. For this, they 
applied the ‘difference-in-difference’ approach to work out the level of the overcharge. Theron and 
Niekerk (2017) estimated the overcharges of the cement cartel which was extended to the SACU 
region to have been between 8.7% and 12.9%. 
 
Khimich, Ivaldi and Jenny (2011) did a study calculating cartel overcharges for cartels across 
different sectors prosecuted in South Africa between 2000 and 2009 and found that on average, 
cartel-affected sales as a percentage of GDP were 3.74%. This point to significant damages on 
the South African market. This is more important given that South African cartels (which may have 
an appreciable impact on the region) often exhibit relative stability. Two of the most stable cartels, 
the De Beers diamond cartel and the South African cement cartel, had their origins in South Africa 
and extended to other regions (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006).  The close trade ties with SACU 
member states therefore make it worthwhile to investigate the possible impact of cartels 
uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa on the SACU member states. Collectively all 
overcharges studies on cartels which were uncovered in South Africa concluded that these cartels 
often exhibit high cartel overcharges similar and in certain instances greater than those of 
conducted in developed markets of the US and Europe.    
 
Quantifying the impact of cartels with cross-border dimensions is challenging task in practice due 
to the unavailability of uniform pricing data across the markets. To this end, trade data is often 
used in the place of actual prices. Levenstein, Suslow and Oswald (2003) used the trade data to 
compute the probable impact of international cartels on developing countries’ trade balances, 
consumers and producers. This analysis covered three cross-border cartels with cartel members 
from developed countries, which had an appreciable impact on developing countries’ economies. 
This entailed the mapping and quantifying the total amount of trade which was affected by the 





by calculating the total “cartel affected” imports as a percentage of total imports and GDP for each 
affected country. They found that the cartel had a substantial impact on developing countries 
imports. This study will also use similar methodology to compute the potential impact of the South 
African bitumen cartel on the SACU region. The methodology is discussed further in Chapter 3. 
 
Of particular relevance to this dissertation, Boshoff (2015) did a study of the price overcharge on 
the bitumen cartel in South Africa, taking into account the cartel’s transition from being a legal to 
an illegal cartel. The study compared different econometric methodologies to compute 
overcharges, while accounting for the fact that the cartel was previously a legally sanctioned 
cartel. As an initial starting point, the study undertook the temporal methodology to calculate 
overcharges. This methodology compares market outcomes (prices and output) for the duration 
of the collusion with a competitive benchmark period.  Second, the study considered a spatial 
approach, which compared market outcomes during the collusive period with those of a similar 
market in another geographical location that was not affected by the collusion. In this instance, 
comparisons were made to the bitumen markets in New Zealand and the US. To that end, the 
study found significant overcharges by the bitumen cartel uncovered in South Africa, of 18% to 
20% (Boshoff, 2015).To the extent that significant overcharges were found in the domestic 
market, it is also possible that similar overcharges also affected the other markets in the region. 
 
The above discussed studies nonetheless probably understate the cartel overcharges 
calculations. This is because these calculations may not take into account the full duration of the 
cartel as this is usually estimated based on assumptions and available data. The duration of 
prosecuted cartels is usually obtained from publicly available case documents that detail the 
period which the cartel was active. In certain instances, however, the exact commencement of a 
collusive agreement may be a period earlier than the period stated in case documents (Evenett, 
Levenstein and Suslow, 2001). Furthermore, overcharges may possibly be biased upwards when 
using the “before and after” approach. This is because prices often remain at higher levels (above 
the “would-have-been” competitive levels) after a cartel has been uncovered and prosecuted.  
Post-cartel prices do not automatically adjust downwards. Therefore, the margin of error in the 
estimation of overcharges is higher for cartels that endured for longer periods (Harrington, 2004). 
In addition, the process of computing overcharges is also complicated by the complexity of 
estimating the “counterfactual price”, often because cartels impact more than the price variable. 
They also impact new business entry, and the rate of technological change, which also 





2.6 Chapter summary 
 
This Chapter gives an overview of the theory of cartels and cartels with cross-border dimensions. 
Economic literature evidences cartels to be the most damaging of all competition contraventions 
as they cause significant harm to consumers. Cartels set prices at levels above competitive price 
levels to the harm of consumers and competition in the market. Therefore, jurisdictions around 
the world have adopted a strong interventionist approach towards cartels. The detection and 
deterrence of collusive conduct therefore remains central to the strategy of any competition 
authority. This is even more important for cross-border cartels as there is evidence from literature 
that these type of cartels are more effective at raising prices and are found to be relatively more 
stable, compared to cartels that are restricted within national borders.  
 
The literature review likewise shows that screening for possible cartel conduct by companies that 
have been uncovered and prosecuted in other jurisdictions is important. Screening enables 
competition authorities to detect and possibly assess the potential impact, if any, on their 
respective countries. The review further considered the calculation of cartel overcharges of cross-
border cartels and found that these result in relatively higher cartel overcharges, on average, 
compared to more geographically localised or national cartels. The study also presented the 
significant overcharges of the South African bitumen cartel calculated in a previous study by 
Boshoff (2015), which is the subject product market in this dissertation. 
CHAPTER 3:  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
The research uses both primary and secondary data derived from multiple sources to answer the 
research questions. First, a qualitative assessment is undertaken from responses of interviews 
conducted with the bitumen industry stakeholders on the bitumen landscape and the degree of 
competition within the SACU region. This is on the premise that a more comprehensive picture of 
activities of cross-border cartels and their effects on both consumers and competitors can be 
derived from a qualitative discussion (Levenstein and Suslow, 2003). Information for the 
qualitative assessments is also derived from the implicated companies’ websites, SABITA 
published documents, newspaper articles and settlement agreement documents from the case. 
Overall, the responses from the interviews and qualitative data from the other sources were used 
to undertake behavioural and structural screening for collusive activity within the bitumen industry, 
guided by the literature. Second, trade data was used to analyse the dependency of the SACU 





derived from import trade data. The study also calculates the possible impact of the bitumen cartel 
on the SACU region. 
 
The study chose the SACU countries for the analysis due to their close proximity to the South 
African market. Moreover, the countries belong to the same customs union with their respective 
local currencies pegged (one to one) to the South African Rand. Consideration was also taken for 
countries that are dependent on the bitumen imports from South Africa as these warrant further 
investigations for cartel activity on the basis of a cartel that was uncovered and prosecuted in 
South Africa. This is as the cartel may have had an appreciable impact on their domestic 
economies. 
 
A semi-structured questionnaire was used for the interviews. Guided by the literature review, 
specific research questions were asked on the market and structure of the bitumen industry in the 
SACU region. The questionnaire also asked questions on bitumen pricing behaviour in the SACU 
region as well as the main drivers of bitumen pricing in the region. The questionnaire used in the 
research is provided in the annexure 3 and the results are discussed in Chapter 4. For the 
qualitative research, the research ethics were dealt with by obtaining ethical clearance from the 
University of Johannesburg, dated 20 May 2019. The ethical clearance is also attached in 
annexure 2. 
 
Open-ended semi-structured questions were decided upon to allow more freedom of interaction 
with the key experts around the questions posed. However, the open-ended semi-structured 
questionnaire approach also has a major drawback. They required time for the interviews to be 
setup, for the interviews to be conducted, for the results of the interview to be transcribed and for 
the transcriptions to be analysed and written up in a report.  
 
The population of stakeholders in the bitumen industry is limited considering the small number of 
bitumen producers in the region. The questionnaire was addressed to senior managers of the 
bitumen producers who are well positioned to provide insights in terms of governance, operations 
and market structure.  
 
SABITA, the industry association was targeted for the unique position it occupies in the bitumen 
industry. All the main bitumen producers as well as most final users of bitumen (road construction 
companies) are members of the industry association. The initial interview was used to source 





Nine8  senior managers and specialists at the bitumen producing companies were then contacted, 
but most refused to participate in the questionnaire, citing issues of confidentiality and contractual 
restrictions on discussing issues relating to pricing and price-fixing. Moreover, those that were 
personally involved in bitumen case that was prosecuted in South Africa are contractually bound 
not to discuss issues relating to the case or the general price generation mechanism. The major 
obstacle encountered in securing more interviews was therefore due to concerns around privilege 
and confidentiality. In total, four responses were received out of the nine entities approached. 
While the absolute number of responses is low, there is value to be drawn from the responses 
received. To supplement for the low response rate, the qualitative section was augmented by 
other research sources mentioned above. 
 
Table 1 below sets out the organisations and designations of persons interviewed. The names of 
the interviewees are withheld at the request of the respondents given the sensitivity of the 
research topic. In the case of the interviewees from the oil companies, even the name of the 
actual companies is withheld because there only are a handful bitumen producers in the region 
hence they can be easily identifiable.  
Table 1: List of interviews 
Name  Organisation Position Date interviewed 
Interviewee 1 SABITA Senior manager 05/08/2019 
Interviewee 2 Bitumen producer (Major 
oil company) 
Bitumen specialist 29/09/2019 
Interviewee 3 Bitumen suppliers and 
services (BTSS) 
Senior manager 03/10/2019 
Interviewee 4 Bitumen (Major oil 




Source: Interviews, 2019, 2020 
Second, quantitative data was collected from a number of databases. The data sources and 
variables employed in the quantitative analysis are summarised in Table 2. The data was 
collected for the period 2000 to 2015. The cartel duration is estimated to have been from 2000 to 
2009. The analysis is done until 2015 to observe changes post prosecution of the cartel and to 
make some inferences about the potential trends after the cartel was uncovered. The data 
sources include UN Comtrade data, IMF database, and Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) and 
                                                          






SABITA reports.  There are missing values for some years in the database, particularly those for 
Lesotho and for that reason, it is dropped from some of the analysis. 
The table below illustrates the data collected.  
Table 2:  Data collected  
Data variable SACU countries 
bitumen import 
data 









Source UN Comtrade data Statistics South 
Africa 
IMF  SABITA IMF 
Unit USD/kg Index points USD/ barrel Tonnes USD millions 
Data range 2000 - 2015 2000 - 2015 2000 - 2015 2000 - 2015 2000 - 2015 
 
Bitumen transaction prices are privately negotiated between the buyers and the sellers and are 
not publicly available. This dissertation therefore uses the bitumen producer price index, 
published as part of the producer price index (PPI) reported by StatsSA as a proxy for the South 
African prices. The bitumen producer price index has, in previous studies of this market, been 
deemed a fair representative of the price series. Boshoff (2015) found that bitumen PPI trends 
were in line with list prices of bitumen from the different bitumen producers. 
 
In general, there are enormous difficulties in undertaking quantitative assessment of cartels due 
the secrecy under which cartels operate. Across the SACU countries, there is a clear gap in 
terms of data on bitumen pricing which is available in a consistent format. This makes it difficult 
to assess price parallelism and price movements in different countries. For this reason, the study 
turns to trade data as a way to analyse and quantify, albeit roughly, the impact the South African 
bitumen cartel had on the SACU member countries. Absent domestic bitumen prices for the 
SACU countries, this study relies on trends in import price data (which are a proxy for domestic 
prices). The import price data is estimated by dividing USD values of the imported bitumen by 
the corresponding volume in kilograms (kgs). The main advantage of the use of this formula to 
estimate the import prices is that it is simple and intuitive and does not require extensive data to 
be implemented. While the weakness is that, the price is still not the direct price of bitumen in 
the respective markets. As discussed in Chapter 4, bitumen in the other SACU countries is 





Although there may be an additional mark-up or discounts when on-sold to customers in the 
respective countries, the import price can provide an indication of trends in list prices in the SACU 
countries. In this dissertation, import prices are therefore used as a proxy for domestic prices in 
the region on the basis that the domestic prices and import prices have the same underlying 
drivers.  
 
Annual bitumen import values (denominated in US dollars) and weight of bitumen in kilograms 
from 2000 – 2015 was sourced from the UN Comtrade database. The HS codes for the data used 
in the study is 271320 - Penetration Bitumen, imports by the Botswana, Lesotho and eSwatini 
from South Africa. This data was used to calculate bitumen import prices for the SACU countries. 
However, it is important to note that there are missing values from the dataset and that some data 
on weights and prices appear to be inaccurate. In line with the procedure by (Boshoff, 2015) 
import data of less than 100 kilograms was discarded from the analysis data, as low recorded 
import weights could be an indication of measurement errors. Boshoff (2015) calculated the 
bitumen import prices for 226 countries from 1990 to 2011. Import price were used to demonstrate 
the evolution of bitumen import prices in comparison to the South African prices. The study found 
that the South African prices exceed average prices over most of the sample period. For this 
dissertation, the calculated import prices are converted to price indices and an analysis of the 
import pricing trend is done, taking into account the collusive markers as suggested in the 
literature (Harrington, 2006). 
 
The relative import prices in the rest of the SACU countries, South African domestic bitumen 
prices and international crude oil prices are plotted together to observe trends in the prices. In 
addition, a simple correlation matrix between the South African domestic bitumen prices and the 
relative import prices is computed. An analysis of the computations is presented in Chapter 4.  
 
To assess the potential impact of the cartel, methodology similar to what is used in Levenstein, 
Suslow and Oswald (2003) is employed. They computed the probable impact of international 
cartels on developing countries’ trade balances, consumers and producers. The Levenstein, 
Suslow and Oswald (2003) analysis covered three cross-border cartels with cartel members from 
developed countries, which had an appreciable impact on developing countries’ economies. This 
entailed the mapping and quantifying the total amount of trade which was affected by the 
price-fixing conduct. Using trade data, the magnitude of the impact of the cartel was measured 





affected country. They found that the cartel had a substantial impact on developing countries 
imports.   
 
Similarly, this study uses the trade flow data to show that the impact of the bitumen cartel 
uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa is likely to have been substantial.  This methodology 
relies on the fundamental, and fair, assumption that the cartel pricing formula was possibly applied 
to the exports market (that is, the cartel price is reflected in the import price in the SACU 
countries). There is no indication that a different pricing for SACU countries was utilised. However, 
it is important to note that a limitation of this methodology is that the “cartel affected” import price 
does not control for other factors which impact prices in the local markets. 
 
Estimating the impact of cross-border cartels is a complex task due to other immeasurable factors 
that may impact prices. In line with the methodology used by Yu (2003), the imports of a cartelised 
good are used as proxy for cartel-affected transactions, this is then used to calculate the cartel 
overcharges. In this dissertation, the impact of the bitumen cartel uncovered and prosecuted in 
South Africa to the SACU member countries is approximated by multiplying the estimated 
overcharge as calculated by Boshoff (2015) with the total “cartelised” goods imported. The 
overcharge is therefore calculated as “imports multiplied by the potential price overcharge. 
Boshoff (2015) estimated cartel overcharges from the bitumen cartel of between 18% and 20% in 
South Africa.  
Limitations 
The main limitation of the methodology is the unavailability of the effective or final (after discounts) 
bitumen prices for the SACU countries. There is therefore a gap in terms of data availability in a 
consistent form across countries for assessment of price parallelism and price movement across 
the countries. This also affects the calculation of the true impact of the cartel if it was extended to 
the region. 
Historic bitumen prices internationally would have further provided another benchmark for 
comparison between SACU countries and other countries globally. This could provide an 
indication of whether prices in the region were higher than other comparable countries globally 
during the cartel period and could be used as another measure to calculate overcharges. 
However, such data is not publicly available and the costs of obtaining the data from private data 






CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS: REGIONAL IMPACTS OF THE BITUMEN CARTEL 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In this Chapter, the analysis of the possible regional impacts of the bitumen cartel that was 
uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa is undertaken. First, the value chain of the bitumen 
industry in the SACU region is mapped. Second, a brief introduction and background to the South 
Africa bitumen case is provided. The Chapter then undertakes a qualitative assessment of the 
competition dynamics in bitumen industry within the SACU region. Lastly, a quantitative 
assessment using trade data of the potential impact of the South African bitumen cartel case on 
the regional SACU markets is presented. 
The analysis in this Chapter seeks to answer the question about whether the behaviour of the 
dynamics in the bitumen industry in the other SACU countries are consistent with competition or 
collusion. This kind of analysis seeks to check if a collusive model fits the data better than a 
competitive model. To do this the bitumen value chain in the SACU region is mapped in the next 
section below.  
4.2 Bitumen value chain in the SACU region 
 
Bitumen is produced, as a by-product in the process of oil production. The rest used in industrial 
applications (Bester, 2014). The production of bitumen takes place in the course of distillation of 
oil. There are different bitumen types, produced from different fuel production processes. Final 
bitumen is predominantly used in the manufacture of asphalt (used for road construction and 
maintenance). Bitumen is produced in various grades; the grade that is the subject of this study 
is penetration grade. 
 
Bitumen is vital in road construction process, and therefore critical in the development of road 
infrastructure in the SACU region. Hence, the price of bitumen and its supply has a wider impact 
for investment into road construction. As a primary road construction intermediate product, 
bitumen prices are a direct cost into construction of roads (Bester, 2014). Access to cheaper 
inputs into road construction relies largely on the competitive environment prevailing between 
market participants. This can be distorted significantly if there are disruptions in the competitive 






Figure 1: The bitumen value chain in the SACU region 
 
 
Source: Author’s construction 
The bitumen industry in the SACU region consists of key stakeholders which include oil refining 
companies (bitumen producers), bitumen value added manufacturers, traders, importers and 
exporters, distributors, immediate consumers (primary road construction firms) and final 
consumers of bitumen and the regional industry association, SABITA. The oil companies are 
vertically integrated along the petroleum value chain with presence at wholesale and retail levels. 
Bitumen is produced in four refineries in South Africa. These are Natref (operated by Sasol and 
Total), Sapref (operated by BP and Shell), Enref (operated by Engen) and Calref (operated by 
Chevron) (Boshoff, 2015).   
 
The coastal refineries Enref and Sapref produce bitumen perpetually as a by-product of fuel 
refining, while Natref refinery produces bitumen by switching to a bitumen production process. 
Therefore, coastal refineries are designed to continuously produce bitumen as a filtrate. As a 
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result of the production configuration of the coastal refineries, they tend to account for the bulk of 
bitumen production and exports in South Africa. Consequently, more than 60% of bitumen 
production capacity is shared by Enref and Sapref refineries in Durban (SABITA, 2007). 
 
South African bitumen producers have substantial operations and presence in the SACU markets. 
In terms of bitumen traders, there are only a few main traders that are vertically integrated with 
construction firms that operate in more than one country. In most cases, these companies (traders 
and construction firms) are South African. Various South African construction firms have 
operations in the region, which are important for these firms’ financial sustainability (SABITA, 
2007).These construction companies typically purchase bitumen in South Africa and use it in the 
region. Due the small domestic markets in the SACU countries, there tends to be close 
coordination between these bitumen producers in their day-to-day operations. This close 
coordination reduces the incentives for competition among the companies as explained in 
Chapter 2. For example, in Namibia, due to the relatively small market for petroleum products, 
companies share import shipments and facilities for storage. This is done to reduce costs and 
maximize benefits (Bank of Namibia Quarterly Bulletin, 2003), but it also means that there is 
greater private information being shared about import volumes as part of the operations of the 
shared infrastructure. This can facilitate collusion as discussed in Section 4.4.2 below. 
4.3 Background to the South African bitumen cartel case 
 
The bitumen cartel was a legal, state-sanctioned, cartel in South Africa until 2000. However, after 
market liberalisation, the legal cartel was disbanded. The cartel comprised of oil companies namely, 
Total, Engen, Shell, Sasol, Tosas, Masana Petroleum Solutions, Chevron and the industry 
association SABITA, in which all the companies were members. The bitumen producers who were 
competitors in a horizontal relationship in the production of bitumen, continued to engage in 
practices emanating from the legal cartel era which post market liberalisation were now in 
contravention of section 4(1)(b) of the South Africa Competition Act no. 98 of 1998 as amended. 
These practices included price-fixing through sharing of price sensitive information through the 
industry body (SABITA).  
 
During the exemption period from 1986 until 2000, the oil firms collectively determined the price of 
bitumen by using a pricelist, the Wholesale List Selling Price (WLSP). This price had the approval 
of the government and was not subjected to price-fixing restrictions. The WLSP for bitumen was 





various transport related costs were added to a Free on Board heavy fuel oil price (linked to the 
international crude oil prices) at typical international refining centres (Boshoff, 2015). The final 
WLSP price also included the SABITA levy, profit margin and the road equalisation factor. 
Information on the WLSP was exchanged through regular email communication between the oil 
companies, informing them of the Rand per tonne escalation figures for each month. A ‘Bitumen 
Price Adjustment Factor’ (BPAF) was used to adjust the present month’s WLSP to calculate the 
next month’s WLSP. It was therefore forward-looking and provided an indication of the pricing 
direction of list prices for the next month (Boshoff, 2015).  
  
After the lapse of the exemption period, it was envisioned that oil companies would set prices 
independently. Contrary to this, the bitumen producers approached SABITA to develop a pricing 
formula to replace the WLSP. Consistent with the recidivist nature of cartelists (Connor, 2007) 
and peculiar features of the bitumen market that include well-known pricing points (in this case 
the WLSP that was used during the exemption period) this provided an environment more 
conducive for the oil companies to continue with the collusive behaviour. Information exchange 
continued among the market participants, through the industry association (SABITA) in the 
interest of continuing to calculate a reference price at the request of government and industry for 
price stability and transparency. This marked the beginning of the illegal bitumen cartel which is 
estimated to have commenced in September 2000 and presumably ended in December 2009 
after the Competition Commission commenced investigations. The investigations were triggered 
by Sasol and its subsidiary, Tosas’s9 request for immunity under the Corporate Leniency Policy. 
The bitumen producers jointly established the pricing formula, which was a reference price and 
price adjustment system for each month. In their defence the oil companies (bitumen producers) 
argued that due to the nature of the bitumen industry, the consumers of bitumen desired fixed 
and a more transparent pricing mechanism for effective adjustment of bitumen prices.  
 
The cartel members approached the industry association to calculate the bitumen reference price 
that was to be used as a referral point to determine actual prices. It was also used as a point of 
reference for price escalation from month to month. Therefore, the bitumen producers agreed on 
a reference price from which actual transaction prices could then be negotiated. SABITA 
calculated the BPAF used to compute monthly transaction prices as follows:  
𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡 =  𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐵𝑃𝐴𝐹 =  𝐵𝑃𝐼𝑡−1[ 𝑓 ∗  
𝐻𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑂𝑡−1
   t (1 − 𝑓) ∗
𝑃𝑃𝐼𝑡
𝑃𝑃𝐼 𝑡−1 
 ]  
                                                          





Source: Adapted from Boshoff (2015) 
Where: BPI is the bitumen price index, BPIt-1 is the bitumen price index for the previous month, BPAF is the 
price adjustment factor, HFO is the heavy fuel oil, which is the price used to approximate for bitumen prices, 
PPI is the producer price index and f is the adjustment factor. 
The outcome of the formula above was termed “the bitumen price index” which was used to adjust 
the bitumen prices throughout a contract period to accurately reflect price fluctuations caused by 
foreign exchange variations, fluctuations in the crude oil prices and domestic influences such as 
the inflation. The bitumen price index was published monthly, enabling contract prices to be 
adjusted at a minimum on a monthly basis. SABITA published the monthly bitumen price index. 
 
While the final price to the end bitumen consumers could have included a degree of competitive 
discounting, the fact that the reference price was determined in a collusive manner still amounted 
to price-fixing. The bitumen producers’ conduct resulted in the final customers being charged 
prices that were not competitively determined. To this end, the CCSA argued that the conduct of 
the bitumen producers harmed the final consumers. Therefore, if the same pricing mechanism 
was used in the SACU region for the bitumen export sales this would amount to price-fixing in the 
region. It is important to note that there was no indication that a different pricing formula was used 
in the SACU region or even in the broader Southern African region, including from the interviews 
conducted.  
 
The Competition Commission alleged that the oil companies engaged in price-fixing in 
contravention of section 4(1)(b)(i) of the South African Competition Act which prohibits price-fixing 
agreements and concerted practices by firms. The Commission also found that the six oil 
companies, which were producers and suppliers of bitumen, sustained the price-fixing 
arrangements by exchanging sensitive price information through the industry association 
SABITA. 
 
The case was concluded through settlement agreements with the oil companies and the industry 
association for price-fixing activities between the years 2000 and 2009. The publicly available 
settlement amounts are presented in Annexure 1. In addition to the payment of fines, the 
companies agreed that they would discontinue the exchange of information regarding prices, 






4.4 Qualitative assessment of competition in the SACU region 
4.4.1 Structural characteristics that facilitate collusion 
 
This study made use of qualitative assessments to deliberate the competition landscape in the 
SACU region. The information was largely derived from interviews conducted with the bitumen 
stakeholders as well as from other research sources as noted in the methodology Chapter. 
 
The general structural characteristics that facilitate collusion are set out in the literature review in 
Section 2.2. These include concentration of companies trading in homogenous products, high 
barriers to entry, stable demand conditions, a history of a legal collusion, high ratio of fixed to 
variable costs, price transparency and symmetry among firms, multi market contact between 
firms, existence of a trade association and cross ownership among firms (Church and Ware, 
2000). A detailed discussion of these factors will be presented below as they relate to the bitumen 
collusion case. 
 
Predictably, the respondents generally noted that there was sufficient competition in the bitumen 
industry within the SACU region during the cartel period. Their response was based on what they 
explained as ‘aggressive pricing’ in the market and the pricing outcome being a process of 
negotiation. With the quality being graded according to industry specifications, the main 
parameter for competition is pricing (Interviews, 2019). Competition is noted to be mainly on 
pricing (lower pricing and higher discounts) and security of supply (that is, sustained long term 
supply). The bitumen specialist also detailed that discounts on transaction prices are negotiated 
with individual customers and are confidential. However, a closer assessment into the structural 
characteristics of the bitumen industry in the SACU region points to an industry conducive for a 
regional cartel. Most structural features of the bitumen industry facilitate collusion. 
 
It was noted that it is more economical for the SACU member states to import bitumen from South 
Africa due to the shorter distances between the countries. Therefore, it is impractical from a 
logistics perspective for land-locked SACU countries (Botswana, Lesotho and eSwatini) to import 
bitumen from alternative sources, although there are small imports from other sources. Bitumen 
needs to be transported and delivered in hot liquid form because a minimum temperature is 
required for the production of asphalt, where it serves as an adhesive binding other materials 
together. Due to the short distance between markets, bitumen from South Africa is moved in hot 
tankers as opposed to importing from other destinations where it would have to be imported cold 





that bitumen could be imported to the SACU markets from other markets at higher prices. Another 
dynamic is that most Middle East and Chinese suppliers (who provide an alternative to South 
African imports) insist on minimum import quantities of (at least 500 tonnes) being imported, while 
this is not case with South African suppliers of bitumen (Interviews, 2019). Small quantities of 
bitumen from South Africa can be supplied in drums or containers to accommodate smaller 
bitumen orders.  
 
There are limited volume usages of bitumen in Botswana, Lesotho, eSwatini and Namibia given 
the small market sizes of their economies. Bitumen consumption in these markets is low relative 
to global volumes, hence the absence of bitumen plants in these markets. Consequently, local 
demand is mainly satisfied by imports from South Africa. In the SACU region, bitumen production 
facilities are only located in South Africa. The four refineries as set out in Section 4.2 account for 
all the bitumen production in the SACU region (Bester, 2014), with the exception of some bitumen 
imports into Botswana and Lesotho that were not from South Africa. This is discussed in Section 
4.5.2. Effectively, bitumen production is concentrated in SACU region to the six oil companies 
that control the refineries. Therefore, for the duration of the cartel period, these companies 
accounted for all bitumen production used for road construction and maintenance in the region.  
 
The findings in Connor (2007) that cross-border cartels predominantly involve firms that have a 
controlling market share in the countries where they operated, is a structural feature which 
increases the possibility that the South African bitumen cartel could have been extended to the 
SACU region because the bitumen producers in the region controlled all bitumen production. In 
the wider Sub-Saharan Africa region as whole, bitumen production capacity is limited. Apart from 
those in South Africa, the other bitumen refineries are located in Zambia and Kenya. However, 
these refineries are often described as erratic and the quality is sometimes questionable (SABITA, 
2007). This implies that there is high concentration in the industry at production level and no 
significant competition for the South African bitumen producing refineries. Moreover, 
concentrated markets are more predisposed to result in cartelisation. A small number of firms 
lowers coordination costs and makes organisation of secret meetings easier. Concentrated 
markets may also imply that the leading firms have a larger market share and may have similar 
cost structures and market shares. This makes it easier for members to monitor each other in 
terms of adherence to the rules of the cartel. The companies were all members of the region trade 
association SABITA, which was also implicated in the cartel that was uncovered and prosecuted 





vertically integrated from refinery level to wholesale marketing and retail distribution networks. 
Another factor is that all the companies have extensive operations in the SACU region.  
 
The absence of significant competition in the region for the South African bitumen exports points 
toward market power by the South African bitumen producers in the region. Moreover, there are 
opportunities for the bitumen producers to exercise this market power through cartel activities 
when faced with weak competition (Martyniszyn, 2012).  
 
Having established that the South Africa bitumen producers face limited competition in the region 
and with bitumen being a relatively homogeneous product, price is the crucial variable for 
competition. This is as the number of parameters that companies have to deliberate to accomplish 
a collusive agreement are reduced. It is also important to mention that homogeneous products 
generally facilitate collusion (Church and Ware, 2000). Together with the lack of substitutes for 
bitumen, this points to a lack of competition for the bitumen producing companies. This in turn 
fosters a conducive environment for a cartel to flourish within the region.  The literature review 
illustrated that cross-border cartels tend to be in industries that are concentrated, trading in 
homogenous products (Connor, 2007). The oil companies that control the bitumen refineries in 
the SACU region have significant operations and presence across the region. Moreover, they 
have operations across different product markets as discussed in Section 4.2. The frequent multi-
market interactions in the different product and geographical markets, increases the likelihood of 
successfully colluding in the market. This is because the greater the multi-market contacts, the 
more times and places the firms interact increases the number of opportunities for monitoring and 
punishing of any deviation from the collusive agreement, therefore increasing the likelihood of 
successful collusion. Furthermore, the industry structure and customary practices make the 
bitumen industry a fertile ground for price-fixing. This is evidenced by cartel cases in the bitumen 
industry in other countries, such as those uncovered and prosecuted in Spain, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, which featured the same oil companies as discussed in the literature review 
(Chapter 2). 
 
As highlighted in the literature review, a common characteristic of cross-border cartels is the 
power to control prices at a regional or global basis (Griffin, 2001). The possession of market 
power by the bitumen producers and the potential to exercise this market power makes it plausible 
that the pricing mechanism used in South Africa could have been extended to the region. As 
postulated by Griffin (2001), membership of a trade association can also facilitate cross-border 





Antitrust Division endured due to a trade association (Connor, 2007). The members of the South 
African bitumen cartel were all members of the trade association, SABITA. SABITA facilitated the 
price-fixing in the South African market as it was used as a platform to calculate the reference 
price which in turn was used to adjust prices on a monthly basis. While it is common practice for 
bitumen prices to be collected and published, this function is customarily done by an independent 
public entity in other countries (Boshoff, 2015). In the South African case, however, this was done 
by a private entity, SABITA, whose members were the major oil companies. As such, this 
exchange of information facilitated the price-fixing between the parties. This is discussed in the 
literature review in Chapter 2 and evaluated in the section on behavioural factors facilitating 
collusion in Section 4.4.2. Information exchange is even more damaging when companies share 
pricing data which is forward looking. In the bitumen cartel case the producers shared information 
on prices which were forward looking (the reference price was used for a new month). Given that 
SABITA is a regional association, it is plausible that the agreements could have extended to the 
whole SACU region.  
After having established the structural characteristics in the bitumen industry which facilitate 
collusion, high barriers to new entry would then be an important consideration to any cartel 
agreement. High barriers to entry could facilitate collusion within the SACU region in the bitumen 
industry. The SACU region is characterised with high barriers to entry due to large investments 
required to establish a bitumen plant. Bitumen production has considerable barriers to entry due 
to the importance of scale economies and the substantial capital investment required in setting 
up bitumen plants. The major oil companies who control bitumen production face no credible 
threat of entry or expansion by other competitors which implies that there is a benefit of continued 
tacit collusion. For the duration of the cartel, the industry was relatively stable with entry and exit 
only occurring after the cartel presumably ended. Bitumen production was concentrated to the 
four South African refineries controlled by the six oil companies prosecuted for price-fixing. There 
is no evidence suggesting that the bitumen producers blocked entry or potential entry into bitumen 
production, therefore in this case entry was limited by the structural features of the industry (high 
capital requirements and the importance of technical and market knowledge). Post cartel, Tosas 
which was jointly owned by Sasol and Total was acquired by the Raubex Group (a road 
construction and rehabilitation company)10 in 2013. This shows that even post- cartel prosecution 








the market structure did not change considerably as acquisition of Tosas by Raubex did not 
change bitumen productive capacity in the region. The history of cartelisation dating back to the 
legal cartel era also facilitates collusion in the region as the market participants are used to 
cooperating than competing. In the case of the bitumen cartel the cartelist were used to jointly 
determining the prices using a predetermined formula. The well-known focal pricing points among 
the cartel participants increases the risk of recidivism. The history cartelisation conducive to 
facilitating collusion as set out in the literature review (Church and Ware, 2000). 
 
Certain market aspects of the bitumen industry make it susceptible to market allocation and 
coordination at a regional level. The geographical location of the SACU countries could facilitate 
market sharing. SACU countries are in close proximity, eliminating the transport distances and 
costs between the countries. As noted in the paragraphs above, shorter transport distances 
present South African exports with relative pricing advantages compared to other countries which 
are further from the SACU markets. Moreover, the fact that the countries belong to the same 
customs union, means that a common tariff (which is relatively less than those that apply to trade 
with other markets) apply. This also adds to the attractiveness of the South African bitumen 
exports. Cartels become stable as trade barriers are reduced. The fundamental reasoning behind 
this perspective is that reduced trade barriers also reduce the costs of punishment and hence 
make the severity of punishment – when breaking the collusive agreement harsher. Lower trade 
barriers, while beneficial for regional trade and economic development, can also make it easier 
for cross-border cartels to maintain collusive outcomes in the region.  Therefore, with reduced 
trade barriers, it is more important to ensure that measures are in place to ensure that 
anticompetitive behaviour does not spill over across borders.  
 
4.4.2 Behavioural factors facilitating collusion in the SACU bitumen industry 
 
The bitumen cartel uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa was mainly on the premise of the 
predetermination of bitumen list prices based on well-known pricing and formulae. The jointly 
calculated reference price acted as a focal price point. In light of the fact that few large companies 
hold the largest share in the regional market and that they have frequent interaction through the 
regional trade association gives rise to the possibility that the oil companies may have extended 
the collusive agreement region-wide. While the sharing of information and the joint determination 
of the price by the oil companies ceased post-cartel, key conditions that facilitate collusion such 
as (well-known focal pricing points) and continued membership in the trade association SABITA 






Information exchanges among competitors increases transparency in the market, which can lead 
to efficiency enhancing benefits but may also present competition risks (Abrantes –Metz, 2013). 
Information exchange on prices between horizontal competitors is prohibited under most 
competition laws as this aids collusive agreements. The artificial removal of the uncertainty about 
competitors’ actions, which is the very foundation of the competitive process, by itself, eliminates 
the normal competitive rivalry. Moreover, information exchange is more likely to restrict 
competition where markets are concentrated, feature high barriers to entry, are non-complex, 
stable and have symmetric cost structures (Levenstein, Sivadasan and Suslow, 2011). The 
bitumen cartel case uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa entailed information exchange on 
a reference price for bitumen and bituminous products. This information exchange restricted 
competition by facilitating a common understanding on prices between competitors. According to 
the Competition Commission of South Africa information exchange guidelines11, information 
exchange of this nature carries the greatest risk. In case of bitumen, the history of collusion in the 
sector created well-understood pricing points that allowed for coordination of behaviour which has 
potential to continue in the market. Therefore, to the extent that the information on prices was 
exchanged in the SACU region, competition was undermined in the region.  
4.4.3 Summary of the structural and behavioural characteristics in the SACU region 
 
In conclusion, the Table 3 summarises the structural and behavioural factors discussed above 
that facilitate collusion in the bitumen industry within the SACU region. 
Table 3:  Economic conditions facilitating collusion in bitumen industry within the SACU 
region   
Structural  and behavioural factors 
facilitating collusion 
Factors in the SACU bitumen market 
facilitating collusion 
High seller concentration Four bitumen producing refineries in the region 
owned by six oil companies. 
Few cartel participants Six oil companies controlling all bitumen 
production in region. 








Lack of  buyer power Bitumen buyers are fragmented and face inelastic 
demand. 
High barriers to market entry 
-Large plants which require large upfront 
investments 
-Sunk investments costs 
- Enormous technological costs 
 
High barriers to entry, bitumen production plants 
require large plants, sunk investment costs. There 
is little prospect of the construction of new 
bitumen plants in the region given the small 
domestic markets. 
Large infrequent transactions Bitumen transactions are large and infrequent in 
nature. 
Annual market growth Steady market growth. 
History of cartel activity The South African cartel was a legal cartel before 
market liberalisation. 
The ‘rules of the game’ were well established and 
persisted for a long time. 
Industry association All bitumen producers are members of the industry 
regional association SABITA. 
Transparency of market prices to buyers including 
information exchange 
Historic known bitumen pricing methodology in the 
region and well known pricing points. 
Private, highly disaggregated information 
exchange through SABITA. 
Source: Author’s construction 
The implication is that these market characteristics are conducive to collusion in the other SACU 
countries, and given the history of collusion by the same firms in South Africa that supply the other 
SACU countries, it is very probable that the collusive outcomes (whether directly or indirectly) 
could have spread across the borders. 
4.5 Quantitative data analysis  
 
Bitumen traders (producers, value added manufacturers and importers) operate on a wholesale 
business-to-business basis, in which discounts are negotiated confidentially and individually. 
Therefore, pricing information is not publicly available, both from South Africa (Bester, 2014) and 
from the SACU member countries. As such, this dissertation uses trade data, reported in volumes 
and values, to make inferences about the pricing of bitumen in the region. As highlighted in the 





the period 2000 to 2015. Data until 2015 is included to observe changes post prosecution of the 
cartel.  
4.5.1 Pricing of bitumen in the SACU region  
 
Given that the quality of penetration bitumen is largely homogenous and standardised, price is a 
major decision variable for any collusive agreement in the bitumen industry. As previously noted, 
actual transaction, prices are not publicly available as these are concluded independently by the 
different bitumen producers and or traders with individual customers. Bitumen prices are impacted 
by the same factors that impact global oil markets, such as significant geopolitical events. 
Therefore, global bitumen prices are strongly correlated with the global oil prices, as bitumen is a 
by-product in the oil production process. Consequently, it is expected that the price of bitumen 
fluctuates in line with the US dollar price of crude oil and the relevant exchange rate. However, 
on a localised level, bitumen prices are most significantly impacted by other factors such as 
product availability, storage capacity and shipping costs. Prices are also driven by the demand 
for bitumen, the number of on-going road infrastructure projects, government road infrastructure 
expenditure and refinery productivity levels (Interviews, 2019). In addition, the interviews revealed 
that bitumen prices are also affected by the locking in on long term contracts in the region 
(Interviews, 2020). The significance of this is that transactions associated with longer term 
contracts tend to have lower prices as would be expected. 
Bitumen is a commodity typically characterised by seasonal demand and consequently, it reflects 
seasonal price volatility. The application of bituminous materials is restricted to periods of dry and 
warm weather conditions. This causes seasonal fluctuations in the demand for bitumen 
depending on the prevailing local climatic conditions. Moreover, in any given calendar year, 
bitumen refineries have to shut down for maintenance work and given that the Sapref refinery 
which is jointly owned by Shell and BP, has the largest bitumen refinery capacity in South Africa, 
prices tend to increase during its shutdown. The construction industry also shuts down for one 
month over December and January for their annual holidays thereby pushing the prices 
downwards due to the depressed demand environment (Interviews, 2019).   
 
Typically, the demand for bitumen is driven by demand from road agencies and municipalities for 
construction works. However, it was noted that demand for bitumen in the region is primarily 
driven by donor funds from donor organisation, such as United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (Interview, 2019). This shows that the bitumen buyers’ market in the region 





on suppliers to destabilise any cartel activity. The other key driver of the demand for bitumen is 
government expenditure for road construction, this also impacts on prices. Most road authorities 
and in particular local authorities (municipalities) tend to hold back on road maintenance 
expenditure until closer to their financial year-end, before issuing orders for the resurfacing of 
their respective roads, thus exerting upward pressure on bitumen prices (SABITA, 2007) and this 
creates lumpy demand. 
 
For the duration of the cartel, the interviewees were of the view that the bitumen prices to the 
SACU markets were set independently by the different oil companies. The interviewees were 
unclear on whether the jointly calculated bitumen index was used as the reference price in the 
export markets. However, while it is plausible that the oil companies determined bitumen prices 
independently, the history of the focal pricing points (Boshoff, 2015), also makes it probable that 
the same pricing mechanism used in South Africa could have been extended to the SACU 
markets. The interviewees were of the view that export prices were much lower than the domestic 
(South African) prices as the bitumen producers compete with other producer countries in the 
supply of bitumen to the SACU markets. However, this statement is to be taken with caution, 
given that the overall level of South African prices are much higher – a feature that reflects the 
long history of a legal collusion in this industry (Boshoff, 2015) and given that there is no 
competitive threat from other imports in the SACU markets as previously highlighted.  
 
According to the interviewees, the payment terms by the SACU bitumen importers also favours 
imports from South Africa over imports from alternative sources. For bitumen imports from 
alternative sources, buyers typically pay 30% on order and the balance of 70% while the goods 
are in transit (with general average transit duration of 6 weeks reported). This is in comparison to 
much more favourable payment conditions from South African bitumen producers which also 
include credit terms for the buyers. It is clear from the interviewees that importing from other 
countries will have a negative effect on the importer’s cash flows. In addition, it is more convenient 
to purchase from South Africa as it has reduced transit time due to the close proximity between 
the countries. The implication for this is that there is limited direct competition for the South African 
bitumen exports from alternative imports for the SACU region. Therefore, in the case of land 
locked countries like Lesotho, eSwatini and Botswana from a logistics point of view, it is 
impractical to consider other countries for alternative supply. 
 
In the absence of individual transaction prices, it is not possible to verify the actual final pricing 





power which they have potential to exercise in the SACU market, given that there is no serious 
competitive constraint from other sources. Therefore, there is a case to be argued for the pricing 
mechanism being similar in the domestic and regional markets, and there is no indication 
(including from interviews with industry stakeholders) that different pricing formulas were used for 
local and SACU sales. 
Figure 2: Comparison of the import prices with SA local prices and the crude oil price 
 
 
Source: UN Comtrade data, Stats SA, Author’s calculations 
 
Figure 2 above plots five series: import prices indices for Botswana, Namibia and eSwatini, the 
South Africa bitumen price index and the crude oil price index. All the prices plotted above are in 
index form with the year 2000 as the base year. The calculation of the import prices is articulated 
in the Chapter 3. The data for Lesotho was dropped, as it had several missing values. As already 
indicated in the methodology section in Chapter 3, disaggregated (transaction) prices are more 
appropriate for analyses of cartels. However, such information is not available in the public 
domain and the only viable option is a price index which captures national prices. As such the 
import prices were in turn converted to index points with the year 2000 as the base year.  The 
figure shows how the import prices moved over the years.  As can be seen, and as would be 
expected, both the domestic South African bitumen price and the import price indices track the 
international crude oil price. While South African prices tracked international crude oil price 
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oil prices declined. After 2008, the South African index remained persistently higher than the 
crude oil price index. 
The prices of bitumen (both domestic and import prices) rapidly rose in the early 2000s, peaking 
in 2007 before dropping in 2009 in line with global financial crisis. The prices rose thereafter in 
line with the global economic recovery. This shows that the bitumen prices tend to respond to 
developments in the global economy as expected. Figure 2 above also shows that for the duration 
of the cartel the import prices in SACU markets largely tracked the South African domestic 
bitumen price index in terms of general trends. There are however, differences in levels and 
certain anomalies as discussed below. 
For the most part of the duration of the cartel, import prices for all countries were above the South 
African prices (except in the case of Botswana, discussed below). This implies that the bitumen 
price index in the SACU markets was higher than the South African price index which was already 
cartelised. The likely reason for this is that prices in the SACU countries followed a similar pricing 
methodology that was used in South Africa. However, the higher prices in the SACU countries 
can be explained by the additional transport, storage costs and other trade related costs.  
After the prosecution of the South African bitumen cartel (post 2009), both the South African 
bitumen price index and import price indices in the other SACU countries continued to move 
together, tracking the crude oil price index. The implication is that the same pricing mechanism 
which mirrors crude oil prices continued to be used in the region. However, as noted above, the 
bitumen prices in South Africa post 2008 are higher than the international crude oil index and in 
the region possibly because of the increased demand in South Africa owing to large infrastructure 
projects leading up to the 2010 Soccer World Cup hosted in South Africa. Moreover, during that 
period a significant general spike in the costs of petroleum products was observed (Ross and 
Field, 2007), spurred by unprecedented growth in several of the world’s largest countries 
(especially China). The lower bitumen prices in the SACU region could be explained by a possible 
lag effect in the sense that prices are locked in long term contracts and on the other hand, it could 
also be explained by the lack of cartelisation in the respective markets. 
Botswana exhibits the most stable prices, while Namibia and eSwatini are characterised by more 
erratic price changes over the period. In particular, there is a noticeable peak in 2008 in the 
Namibian import prices. The driver of this anomaly is however, likely to be attributable to a 






Interestingly, as previously noted, the import price index for Botswana was lower than the South 
African index in some periods.  As will be shown in Table 7 Botswana was the only country of all 
the SACU member states that had sourced some of its bitumen requirements from other countries 
(China and US) during the cartel period.   
A correlation analysis in Table 4 below also illustrates that the South African and the SACU prices 
have a strong positive correlation. There is a strong correlation between the price indices for 
South Africa and Namibia, and a fairly strong correlation between South Africa and eSwatini. 
While this is not surprising given the correlation with crude oil, it also suggests that pricing 
practices in South Africa may have spilled over to these countries. Although not conclusive, a high 
degree of correlation is a collusive trend marker (Harrington, 2006), as discussed in the literature 
review in Chapter 2. The correlation coefficient for South Africa and Botswana is much weaker, 
again raising the possibility that the imports from outside South Africa might have the effect of 
destabilising any possible cartel pricing in that country 
Table 4:  Correlation matrix SA bitumen index vs Import price index   
 
Cartel duration  (2000 -2009) 
Botswana      0.41225 
Namibia         0.87809 
eSwatini        0.62002 
Source: Author’s own calculation based on the UN Comtrade data 
 
Post-cartel prosecution South African export volumes to the SACU region have continued to 
increase, relative to the cartel period as shown in table 7. The post-cartel export statistics are 
illustrated in table 5 below. Although the interviewees noted that there is increasing competition 
in the post cartel period (2010 – 2015) to the South African bitumen exports, the trade data proves 
contrary. The increase in the export volumes is an indication that even after the disbandment of 
the cartel, in terms of trade, business is continuing as usual. Therefore, this could imply that the 
status quo in the competitive dynamics within the region has remained the same with South 
African exports dominating these markets. This could be attributable to the factors discussed 
above such as the relatively shorter transport distances. The trade data below clearly demonstrate 
that there has been limited export penetration to the bitumen market in the SACU region from 
other countries, with exception of Lesotho whose import volumes remain low and insignificant 
compared to the rest of the region. Lesotho sourced some of its bitumen requirements from 
alternative sources, driven by bitumen procurement conditions for donor funded road construction 





Table 5:  Bitumen imports in the SACU markets from South Africa 
Summary of key statistics 2010 – 2015 (Post-cartel period) 
 Total value imported bitumen 
(USD) 
% of the total bitumen imports ( 5 
year average) 
Botswana 7 329 704 96.4 
Namibia 28 171 339 100 
eSwatini 5 664 017 100 
Lesotho 603 979 74 
Source: Author’s own calculations based on UN Comtrade data 
The special case of Botswana  
For the duration of the cartel period, (2000 – 2009) Botswana is the only SACU country which 
sourced some of its bitumen requirements from other countries when the South African bitumen 
cartel was operational. The actual bitumen figures that were sourced from alternative sources 
during years which the bitumen cartel was in operation in South Africa is depicted in Table 6 
below. This is in comparison with the other SACU countries who sourced all (100%) of their 
bitumen requirements from South Africa for the duration of the cartel. The reason for Botswana 
importing from alternative sources could be conditions of donor funded road infrastructure projects 
or better alternative pricing. As discussed above donor funding for road infrastructure plays a 
significant role in the SACU markets. According to the interviewees, donor funders, at times 
dictate the countries from which bitumen is to be imported (Interviews, 2019). 
The periods which Botswana sourced, some of its bitumen requirements from other countries 
corresponds to lower prices of imported bitumen for the country. The average import price 
differential between Botswana and that of Namibia and eSwatini is significant (as illustrated in 
Figure 2 above), however, it is possible that the differential may be biased due to the 
measurement error in 2008 and the base effect of using the year 2000 as the base year for 
computing the import price indices. The comparison of the import prices enforces the results of 
the correlation matrix which showed that Botswana had a low correlation to the South Africa 
prices. These points to potential evidence that where there is some, albeit small level of 
competition from sources other than South Africa, prices were lower during the formal cartel. This 
shows that donors may have countervailing buyer power (which is often absent in the region) and 
are able to get lower prices. This is an important competitive constraint to the South African 





These results illustrate that a little competition for the South African exports had an effect of 
reducing the overall average prices compared to the countries that sourced all their bitumen 
requirements from South Africa. However, it is important to note that, these results are subject to 
certain limitations, as the conditions in the countries may not be directly comparable. Moreover, 
the analysis did not explicitly take into account other factors that affect import prices.  
Table 6:  Botswana bitumen imports (2000 -2009) 
 Imports from South 
Africa (USD) 
Imports from the 
world (USD) 
% of imports from 
South Africa 
2000 11 315 11 315 100 
2001 549  549 100 
2002 13 963 13 963 100 
2003 245 731 245 731 100 
2004 154 080 154 080 100 
2005 72 455 72 455 100 
2006 54 763 79 000 69 
2007 72 346 102 000 71 
2008 37 821 37 821 100 
2009 135 488 173 000 78 
2010 882 628 1 004 000 88 
2011 1 316 895 1 446 000 91 
2012 1 747 802 1 747 802 100 
2013 563 197 563 197 100 
2014 1 690 555 1 690 555 100 
2015 1 128 627 1 128 627 100 
Source: UN Comtrade data, Author’s calculations 
 
Conclusion on pricing assessment 
While the analysis in this section is not conclusive evidence of collusion in the bitumen industry 
in South Africa extending to the SACU region during the cartel period. The presence of structural 
factors  which are conducive for collusion and the dependency of the SACU markets on the South 
African exports for their bitumen requirements highlights that competition authorities in the region 
need to timeously investigate cross-border effects of cartel activity uncovered in another country 
in the region. This is even more important when the anti-competitive effects emanate from South 





given the structural and behavioural characteristics discussed, and the significance of exports by 
the cartel members that the cartel conduct could have been extended to the region. 
4.5.2 Quantifying the possible impact of the bitumen cartel in the SACU region 
 
Growing interest in the impact of cross-border cartels has produced a number of important works 
in the field, for instance, by the OECD (2003), Levenstein and Suslow (2003), Connor (2001) and 
Yu (2003). Although purchases made by the SACU countries from the companies prosecuted for 
collusive behaviour cannot be observed directly, we can infer from aggregated trade data 
information on bitumen purchases and import price fluctuations.  
To quantify the impacts of the cartel conduct potentially spreading into the SACU region, this 
dissertation takes imports of bitumen from South Africa as proxies of sales of the cartelised 
product to the SACU member states. Absent other available information, the trade data provides 
the best proxy of the cartel’s impact on developing country consumers (Yu, 2003). There are very 
few studies of the economic effects of cross-border cartels, and there is no consensus on the 
correct way to measure these effects. In addition, data problems make this kind of analysis 
extremely difficult. Furthermore, it is not possible to measure accurately the impact on the market 
of a cartel, due to insufficient information on actual bitumen transaction prices after discounts.  
Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is still possible to give an indication of the extent of harm. 
Given the magnitude of the trade figures shown in Table 7 below, it is possible that the cartel 
adversely affected a significant portion of trade in value terms and therefore the trade balances 
of the respective countries. If the cartel distorted the bitumen market in the wider SACU region, 
these countries would have suffered substantial losses in the form of welfare transfers from the 
purchasers to the sellers of the bitumen and deadweight losses.  
During the period under review, South Africa was a net exporter of bitumen to the SACU member 
countries. As discussed in the qualitative section, the other economies in the SACU region do not 
have bitumen production capacities. In addition, it was also noted that there is no significant 
competition for the South African bitumen exporting refineries in the other SACU countries. 
Therefore, the SACU member countries are to a large degree dependent on South African 
refineries to supply their bitumen needs.  
The trade data for the duration of the cartel (2000 – 2009) in Table 7 confirms that the South 
African bitumen exports faced insignificant competition in the SACU region as the countries 





published on the SABITA website which shows that local South African consumption was less 
than the local supply. Thus, the scale of production of bitumen in South Africa is far above the 
demand for local consumption as well as those of neighbouring economies. Therefore, it is clear 
that the SACU countries imported a large proportion of their bitumen requirements from South 
Africa. 
Table 7: Summary of bitumen imported by the SACU countries from South Africa (2000 - 
2009) 
Country Total value imported 
(USD) from SA 
% of the total 
bitumen imports to 
country (average) 
% of GDP 
Namibia 8 564 605 100 0.161 
eSwatini 839 943 100 0.034 
Botswana 798 511 91.9 0.009 
Lesotho 373 743 100 0.031 
Total  10 576 802  0.235 
Source: UN Comtrade data, IMF World Economic Indicators Database, Author’s calculations  
Following the approach of Levenstein, Suslow and Oswald (2003), Table 7 summaries import 
data for SACU countries. It is reported in three ways: in absolute US dollar values, as a 
percentage of total bitumen imports and as a percentage of the respective country’s GDP.  The 
GDP figure used are the figures for each corresponding year, after which the average over the 
period is reported in the Table 5 and 7. The total value of bitumen imports which could potentially 
had been a result of collusive pricing mechanism in the SACU member countries over the duration 
of the cartel amounted to approximately US$10.6 million. This is an aggregation of the total South 
African bitumen exports to all the SACU countries. The figure is significant and if the cartel had 
been extended to the region, it then implies that the impact was substantial. Therefore, it would 
warrant further investigations by the competition authorities in the other SACU countries.  
In order to provide an estimate of the order of magnitude of the overcharge of the bitumen cartel, 
this dissertation uses Boshoff (2015) overcharge estimates calculated for the South African cartel 
case. Boshoff (2015) calculated the estimated overcharges to be between 18% and 20% over the 
years the illegal cartel was active (2000 – 2009), while taking into account that the cartel was 
previously a legal cartel.  
If the cartel indeed extended to the SACU region, taking a conservative estimate of 18% price 





totalled approximately US$1.9 million over the duration of the cartel (Table 8). In other words, the 
SACU countries, on the more conservative measures, paid US$1.9 million more on average than 
they would have absent the cartel, and on the less conservative measure of 20%, they paid 
US$2.1 million. This potential overcharge of between US$1.9 million – US$2.1 million calculated 
by this study is an approximate estimate of the welfare loss due to the potential collusion. If indeed 
the cartel was extended to the SACU region, this impact was indeed substantial. However, any 
conclusions, about the effects of cartel activity need to be drawn with great care as this is an 
approximation of the direct price effects and any cartel activity could have had far reaching indirect 
effects when taking into account multiplier effects. 
Table 8: Possible overcharges from the bitumen cartel in the region  
Country  Total value 
imported (USD) 
(2000 - 2009) 
Possible overcharges 
(calculated at 18%) 
Possible 
overcharges 
(calculated at 20%) 
Namibia  8 564 605 1 541 629 1 712 921 
eSwatini  839 943 151 190 167 989 
Botswana 798 511 143 732 159 702 
Lesotho 373 743   62 274 74 749 
Total 10 404 919 1 903 824 2 115 361 
Source UN Comtrade, Author’s calculations 
4.6 Chapter summary 
 
Bitumen is a by-product in the production of fuel. Therefore, the bitumen business decisions are 
susceptible to being taken at the group level in respect of the production of fuel. This increases 
the risk that pricing decisions could to have been taken at a regional level, as well as because the 
SACU member countries are likely be treated as extensions of the South African market. Given 
that the bitumen producers who were prosecuted for cartel conduct in South Africa accounted for 
nearly all of SACU market’s bitumen supply, there is a need to screen and assess the impact 
(direct and indirect) that this cartel had on these markets. The analysis in this Chapter has 
illustrated that the SACU bitumen markets have structural and behavioural characteristics that 
are conducive for collusion. There are a few bitumen producers in the SACU markets, which 
facilitates co-ordination. Moreover, the producers have multimarket contacts given their 
interaction in several different fuel product markets in the petrochemicals industry. The trade data 
further illustrated that the SACU member states were almost wholly dependent on the South 





that import pricing outcome in the region mirrors that of the domestic market. Analysis of potential 
damages to the SACU region shows that if the cartel was extended to region, the damages could 
have been substantial. This therefore warrants further investigations of the cartel members’ 
conduct in the region.  
 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the advent of globalisation and trade liberalisation, individual economies have become 
intrinsically linked. Therefore, anti-competitive conduct in one geographical location may have an 
impact in another geographical location. This is increasingly more evident in the area of cross-
border cartels. In Southern Africa, given the trends in trade and investments between South Africa 
and the SACU member states there is a high probability that a cartel that has taken place in South 
Africa could have been also extended to other countries in the region (Kaira, 2015).  
Despite the record fines and assured vigorous enforcement in South Africa, there is little indication 
that cartel activity is declining (Kaira, 2015). The continuous discovery of cartels in South Africa 
indicates that they remain relatively under-deterred. In part, this may be due to discovered cartels 
not being sanctioned in all jurisdictions where they caused harm and the sanctions not accounting 
for the harm in foreign markets. While the South African authorities have achieved relative 
success in unearthing and prosecuting cartels in the past few years, other competition authorities 
in the SACU region namely, the Botswana Competition Commission, Namibia Competition 
Commission and the eSwatini Competition Commission have not been as successful in this 
regard. There has been relatively little activity on the part of the other competition authorities in 
the region to respond to these cartels even after they have been uncovered in South Africa. Given 
that cartels tend to appear among domestic firms first, before going cross-border (Fear, 2006), 
the SACU national competition authorities and regional competition bodies like the CCC should 
proactively investigate these cartels. 
Very little work has been done on the detection and screening for collusive arrangements between 
firms which cuts across national borders in Southern Africa. This is in stark contrast to the actions 
of the Canadian competition authority, which has consistently pursued anti-competitive cases 
against firms that have been investigated by the US Department of Justice (Levenstein and 
Suslow, 2003) in the neighbouring US. This has largely been on the premise of the close trade 
ties between the countries and the overlap of companies operating across the two countries.  
Given that the South African Competition Commission does not consider a cartel’s gains from 





timeously investigate any conduct that has possible links to its economies. This is more important 
given that two of the most stable cartels, the De Beers diamond cartel and the South African 
cement cartel, according to a study done by Levenstein and Suslow (2006) had their origins in 
South Africa. To effectively deter cross-border cartels, the competition agencies of neighbouring 
jurisdictions ought to become more active in investigating and ultimately prosecuting such cartels 
to sufficiently deter cross-border or multi-market cartels. The nature of economic integration 
between South Africa and SACU member states indeed warrants close monitoring of anti-
competitive conduct developments by the SACU member states for any links to their respective 
economies. 
The lack of prosecution by other countries in the SACU region may present problems to the efforts 
of detecting cartels in South Africa and in the region as a whole. If these cartels have significant 
effects on the SACU member states consumers and producers, the lack of antitrust prosecutions 
by these countries against these cartels is an important problem. This is, as geographically limited 
prosecutions do not provide sufficient disincentives to deter collusion that has region-wide 
benefits for colluding firms. Therefore, given the low levels of prosecution outside South Africa in 
the SACU region, consideration should be given on calculating fines in South Africa routinely on 
the basis of the cartelised market having a direct or indirect impact in the region to sufficiently 
deter collusion in all markets. In addition, it is important for the South African authorities to 
consider an enhancement to the current leniency programme which would reward firms in the 
form of related immunity, if they inform the authorities on collusive activity in any of the SACU 
markets that are not yet under any investigations. 
Apart from Lesotho, all the SACU member states have enacted competition laws and have an 
operational competition authority. Lesotho has a draft competition law and at the time of writing it 
not have a functioning competition authority. The Minister responsible for Trade and Industry in 
Lesotho announced that the country is in the process of drafting a competition law to pave way 
for the formation of a competition commission12 organisation. All the competition laws in the SACU 
region include specific anti-cartel provisions. Cartel conduct is per se illegal in all countries with 
competition laws in the region but enforcement has been relatively weak, with little activity done 
in this regard. This means that the mere existence of collusion is enough to satisfy a finding 
against the firms involved without necessarily considering any mitigating circumstances. Although 
the competition laws of specifically Namibia and Botswana apply to all economic activity within 
                                                          





the countries or having an appreciable impact on the country’s economies, there has been little 
initiative to follow up on cartel activity emanating from South Africa.  
This study used the bitumen cartel that was uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa to 
demonstrate using screening mechanisms for a cartel to determine if the cartel uncovered in 
South Africa could have had an appreciable impact on SACU members’ respective countries’. 
Structural and behavioural factors facilitating collusion in the bitumen industry in the SACU region 
were reviewed. The study found a myriad of structural and behavioural factors that are conducive 
for a cross-border cartel. The trade data demonstrated the SACU member states’ dependency on 
South Africa for their bitumen requirements.  In addition, the import pricing data derived from trade 
data mirrors that of the South African bitumen prices. Together these factors suggest that there 
is a strong possibility that the effects of the cartel were felt in the region and that collusive pricing 
could have been extended region-wide. Given that the arrangements between the bitumen 
producers have shown potential to undermine rivalry, as well as the history of cartel conduct in 
South Africa, this in itself is an important red flag for the competition authorities in the region to 
consider. This increases the possibility that the bitumen cartel in South Africa could have been 
facilitated in the region by proximity of the markets and the membership of the common customs 
union which makes the movement of goods between South Africa and its SACU neighbours 
easier. In addition, various cartels have also existed in the bitumen industry internationally, which 
have had cross border elements. In Europe, cartels in the bitumen industry were uncovered and 
prosecuted in the Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. Of particular importance to this study, the 
cartel in Spain had an appreciable impact to other countries in the European region. In terms of 
the bitumen cartel uncovered and prosecuted in South Africa, investigations have not been 
extended to markets in the SACU member states to inquire whether these markets were 
cartelised or directly affected by the cartel uncovered in South Africa.  
While the analysis that is done in this paper does not provide conclusive evidence of collusion, 
the patterns identified in this paper warrant further in-depth investigations in which data which is 
more detailed can be collected. The analysis presented in this paper is innovative in the use of 
trade date to compute import price indices for pricing analysis and for calculating the impact of 
the cartel, but there are limitations to its scope and quality. This paper simply demonstrated that 
basic screens of structural and behavioural factors conducive for collusion and a review of pricing 
trends derived from trade data in the absence of direct transaction prices could be used to 
determine if a cartel emanating from South Africa could have had appreciable cross-border 





states and facilitate cartel detection, therefore increase the deterrence rates. The formal 
investigations could then facilitate for the collection of data directly from the exporting and 
importing companies (disaggregated data), for analysis of the trends and to acquire direct 
evidence of collusion if it is confirmed. In the absence of leniency applications, SACU countries 
are more likely to recognise the existence of cross-border cartels through enforcement activities 
emanating from South Africa. This will also require increased cooperation between the 
competition authorities in the region and processes and platforms, such as the African 
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 Annexure 1: Settlements from the bitumen cartel 
 
SABITA R500 000 < 10% annual income from 
membership fees 
Engen R28 800 000 <10% of its total income 
and exports from South 
Africa for the 2009 
financial year 
Shell R26 259 480 < 9% of its total income 
and exports from South 




R13 000 000  
Sasol R0 (granted conditional 
immunity) 
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Annexure 3:  Questionnaire topic guide 
 
 
1. Mapping the competitive landscape 
 
a. Describe the competitive landscape of the bitumen industry in the SACU region 
countries.  
b. Map out the value chain for penetration grade bitumen. 
c. Who are the main industry suppliers in each SACU country? What is their ownership 
structure? 
d. Is there local production capacity?   
e. What is the market share of each player in each country? (Please specify if this share is 
in terms of capacity, production, sales volumes or values). 
f. What are the demand and supply dynamics in the respective countries? 
g. Who are the main customers of penetration grade bitumen? 
h. What are the other sources of imports? 
i. Have there been any new suppliers of penetration grade bitumen in the past 10 years? 
 
 
2.  Pricing mechanism and price levels  
 
a. What is the pricing mechanism for penetration grade bitumen at the wholesale and retail 
levels? 
i. What is the pricing formula? 
ii. How are the components determined? 
iii. Are international benchmarks used? If any, please specify them. 
iv. Are discounts offered off a list price? How are these determined? 
b. Has this mechanism and/or formula changed in the last 10 years?  
i. If so, what were the changes? 
ii. What were the reasons for the changes? 
iii. Where the resultant prices higher or lower than they would have been 
under the previous mechanism? 
c. What are the reliable sources of data for bitumen and bituminous products in each 
country in the region? 
d. What data is publicly available on bitumen prices? 
e. Does regulation affect the price at any level of the value chain in each country? 
 
 
3. Trade and transportation of bitumen 
 





b. Do the primary producers of bitumen in South Africa export directly to the other countries 
in the SACU region? Do they have agents? Do they sell to wholesalers? 
c. What are the arrangements with regards to transportation of bitumen across the region?   
d. What are some of the transport-related costs involved in exporting to each country?  
e. Are there any non-tariff barriers that add to the price of bitumen exported from South 
Africa? 
 
